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Federal Control of Campaign
Contributions
The author argues that the political system suffers
several adverse consequences as a result of inadequate
regulation of campaign contributions. For example, the
present controls fail to provide incentive for mass contri-
butions; accordingly, the influence of large contributors
has not been curbed. The author rejects the sanction ap-
proach, now in use, in favor of structuring the system to
encourage participation of large numbers of citizens. He
then submits that contributions of substantial amounts
should be more fully publicized, tax credit should be al-
lowed for small contributors on an experimental basis, a
direct government subsidy should be granted to political
parties, and candidates should be able to deduct personal,
unreimbursed campaign expenditures.
Martin Lobel*
I. MONEY AND POLITICS
A. LAw AND REALITY
Effective law reform must be based on a realistic concept of
what exists, what can reasonably be accomplished, and what
may be the probable consequences of a change in the law. This
is particularly true when dealing with federal control of cam-
paign contributions, reform of which is long overdue. Those who
pass upon such laws are the ones who are most affected by them.
More importantly, the consequences of ill-considered tampering
with electoral processes favor a conservative approach. It is
for these and other reasons which will become apparent that no
attempt to "reform" present laws controlling campaign contri-
butions should be undertaken without understanding how money
flows through and affects our political system.
B. EFFECT OF MONEY ON THE OUTCOlAE OF ELECTIONS
Putting aside for the moment the candidate who, for lack of
money, cannot enter the race for nomination,' the effects of
money in a campaign will vary depending upon the nature of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of
Law.
1. See § I. D. infra.
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campaign, the availability of money at critical junctures, and the
rational allocation of available money.
"A campaign is a means to win only where the net result
of all other factors will put within a narrow range opponents'
totals of prospective votes."'2 Thus, the closer the contest, the
more significant every contribution becomes, and the greater be-
comes the obligation felt by a candidate to contributors of
critical sums. This problem increases as the size of the constitu-
ency decreases; it is almost axiomatic in politics that the smaller
the constituency, the greater the influence a given amount of
money attains.
Rational planning of campaign strategy is extremely diffi-
cult because of uncertainty as to whether enough money will be
available when it is needed. Campaigners do not know when or
how much money they will receive. Usually most contributions
come at the end of a campaign when there is no time to change
existing plans to spend the sudden influx of money rationally
and rapidly.3 Indeed, many defeats can be attributed to lack of
money at the right time, although the total monies received
would seem quite sufficient.4 A candidate cannot, unless he can
personally assume the expenses,5 run a deficit without some
reasonable expectation of receiving sufficient contributions to
cover it. Although this latter problem is quickly solved for the
winner,6 many candidates, particularly those in party primaries,
cannot reasonably rely upon this expectation.
The ebb and flow of funds reflect public interest in a cam-
paign and contributors' expectations of the probable winner.
Small contributions tend to reflect public interest, thus there is
usually a spurt of such contributions at the beginning of a cam-
paign and again at the end-when interest is highest. On the
other hand, large contributions, which make up the bulk of money
2. BULLIT, To BE A POLITICIAN 69 (1961).
3. See LEViN, THE COMPLEAT PoImcIAN 238-39 (1962).
4. See Id. at 231.
5. By so doing a candidate might run afoul of the statutory limita-
tion upon the amount he can spend. See 43 Stat. 1073 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §
248 (1964). Although federal limitations are not applicable to candi-
dates for nomination or to presidential candidates, whether this action
would constitute a violation by congressional candidates is quite another
matter. Most states impose lower limitations on candidate expenditures
than does the federal statute; and many state statutes apply to campaigns
for nomination. See ALEXANDER & DENiNy, REGULATION OF PoLrricAL Fi-
NANcE 59-61 (1966).
6. See ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE PARTIES AND CAmPAIGNS, THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND TRANsITIoN, 1960-1961 116 (1961).
7. See LEVIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 238-39.
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contributed, are more likely to "fluctuate according to the con-
tributors' estimates of who is most likely to win." This leads
to a form of self-fulfilling prophecy: the more money a candi-
date has, the more likely he is to win, and the more likely he is
to receive even more money.9
Money alone, however, will not win an election. Although
"most, but by no means all, winners had had the longer campaign
purses . . . it seems equally clear that in the really great elec-
tions, the presidential sweepstakes, the size of the campaign chest
does not in itself control the outcome .... 10 However, the
real problem lies not in presidential elections, but in state and
local elections, where money exerts greater influence because of
the smaller size of the constituency and a greater need to pur-
chase access to the public through mass media. But even here
there are many factors inherent in a campaign which "may make
it impossible to 'buy' an election."'"
Actually, the most important effect of money in a political
campaign is not that the candidate with the most money will
win, but that the candidate with the lesser amount of money will
not be able to present his case to undecided voters.12 Although
most voters have made up their minds even before a campaign
begins,13 those who have not are usually hardest to reach and
inform. To do so takes a great deal of money or time, and since
the poorer candidate cannot afford the money, he must expend
more time campaigning to equalize his opponent's advantage.
Probably many more potential candidates do not run because
they cannot afford to take off the necessary time from work.
8. Id. at 239.
9. See id. at 240.
10. KEY, PoLrmcs, PARTmS, AND PRESSURE GROUPs 564 (4th ed.
1958).
11. LEViN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 242-43. For example:
Some well-heeled candidates may be inept when it comes to
planning strategy; other candidates, who may have that sixth
political sense, may be hindered in executing strategy by the
uneven flow of funds. Some candidates waste sums on irrational
or ineffective tactics. Even though big money can buy the best
public-relations men and the best pollsters, the fact remains that
even the "experts" do not yet know enough about the relative
effectiveness of the various mass media in politics or about the
"correct" political style to anticipate and control the responses of
the electorate with precision .... Therefore, although one can
say that a candidate who does not have money is clearly not in
the running, it is not so easy to translate money into votes.
12. Y=Y, op. cit. supra note 10, at 564-65.
13. See Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance:
A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 976-77 (1953). See




The most characteristic feature of the American party system
is its political and financial decentralization. 14 Although both
major parties tend naturally to huddle in the center of the ideo-
logical spectrum,15 decentralization tends to obscure those ideo-
logical differences which may exist.16 Thus, since local can-
didates may or may not, depending upon local conditions,
17
represent the ideological position taken by the national party,
voters are often deprived of an opportunity to express their opin-
ion about major national policies.' 8 One should not, however,
belittle local interests, which a candidate should represent. Be-
cause of tension between national and local needs, all too often
the former must give ground to the latter because party dis-
cipline is lacking. Even if alienated local money 9 could be re-
placed on the national level, there should be no need to fear a
strong national party because local candidates must represent
local views in order to be elected.
Many causes for this decentralization may be cited: the
federal system, combined federal and state elections, 20 lack of a
14. The American political system is diffused in two ways.
Vertically, the parties are composed of layer upon layer of pre-
cinct, city, county, congressional district, and national committee,
each layer tending toward autonomy and even commanding in-
dividual loyalties-and receiving individual contributions-based
upon diverse personal and often parochial social, economic, and
political interests. Horizontally, candidates, party and non-party
committees, and labor and miscellaneous committees all cam-
paign side by side, sometimes cooperating, sometimes not-but
all competing for scarce political dollars.
ALEXANDER, RESPONSIBILITY IN PARTY FINANCE 31 (1963).
15. See HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
16. See Bicks & Friedman, supra note 13, at 997-98.
17. Since the parties lack funds to help individual candidates, most
campaigns tend to reflect local conditions and needs more than policies
of the national parties. Because a candidate cannot risk offending a
large local contributor, all too often national party policy does not even
get a hearing.
18. It must be realized, however, that the two parties will probably
never have widely diverging platforms or programs for very long. The
need to win forces politicians to bend to the desires of the people. See
DowNs, AN EcoNoMIc THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
19. The problem of alienating sources of local contributions is not
as clear-cut as it might seem. Loss of money is important to a candidate,
but he is even more concerned that lost money should not go to his
opponent. Thus a candidate is more likely to follow a national party
policy when his vote costs him money than when that vote will cost him
money which will go to his opponent.
20. Combined federal and state elections create competition for
contributions in which it is easier for state candidates to raise money.
This is due to the greatest possible "return" to the average contributor
to candidates for office on the state level.
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national constituency, lack of effective national party sanctions
or incentives, 2 1 and laws which limit the amount of contribu-
tions each party committee can receive. 22 Most of these causes
relate to the fact that most campaign money is raised and spent
at the local level.23  Since money flows upward in our party
system rather than downward, the parties and candidates must,
unless the President is a member of the party, rely primarily
upon local sources for their funds. Thus national funds, which
could be used to help unify the party, are in short supply. Can-
didates, who must raise most of the money they need themselves,
are thus encouraged to establish their own nonparty committees
for this purpose.24 While some justification does exist for such
non party committees-they are the best means of garnering
contributions from certain groups25-the end results are to ac-
centuate the difficulty of co-ordinating party campaigning and to
encourage even more decentralization.
Getting the money from local sources is a difficult process.
There is little that can be done to force recalcitrant local commit-
tees to contribute to national party coffers. 26 Most local com-
mittees which have adequate financing see no reason to share
their money with the national party, although they appreci-
ate publicity and information furnished them by their national
committees, and they are more than willing to ride upon the
coattails of a strong national candidate. Another, but usually
unspoken reason, is that if a candidate receives money from the
national committee rather than the state committee, he will not
be dependent upon the state committee. The extent to which
ideological divergence between national and state committees op-
erates as a bar to contributions is, however, often overstated.
21. Despite a large degree of decentralization, British political
parties have maintained rigid party discipline. See generally McKENzIE,
BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES (1955). However, the British framework is
not applicable to the American party system. See Newman, Money &
Elections in Great Britain--Guide for America?, 10 WESTERN POL. Q. 582
(1957).
22. E.g., 62 Stat. 723 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 609 (1964), discussed in §
III. D. infra.
23. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 258 (Anchor ed. 1962).
24. Successful candidates, then, owe their election to a variety
of separate committees, rather than to the national party which
is responsible for post-election effectuation of the party pro-
gram. This obligation to local committees, in turn, loosens ties
of successful candidates to the national platforms on which they
supposedly ran and were elected.
Bicks & Friedman, supra note 13, at 997.
25. See § I. E. infra for a discussion of this fund raising technique.
26 See ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 41.
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Most state committees are ideologically neutral or are more con-
cerned with patronage than with ideology . And, since national
party ideology must reflect the consensus of those in power in
the party, strong ideological conflicts are very rare, except over
such issues as race relations, which are likely to divide both
parties.
Since the national parties cannot rely upon local sources for
funds to enable them to operate on at least a minimal level, they
have had to turn to large contributors, fund raising" affairs,
q4uotas, and direct mail solicitation. And even here, unless '
fiational party committee has the power and prestige of the Pres-
ident behind it, it will run into competition from the congres-
sional and senatorial party committees which have more to offer
to large contributors27 and candidates.
28
Given the present situation, there is some doubt whether
unified fund raising will significantly unify the parties. The re-
cent experience of the Republican Party, which had a highly
integrated fund raising organization,2 9 indicates that this alone
is not sufficient to maintain a unified party2 0 Although the
Republicans emphasized fiscal efficiency over political unity,
aside from and in conjunction with the ideological split, the ma-
jor reason for the intraparty dissension seemed Io be that other
organizations were-able to offer mcre money than -could regular
national party committees.31 . The Republican National Commit-
tee is making strenuous -efforts to unify fund raising again and
seems to be raising substantial sums of money independently of
state committees.3 2 For the moment, however, all it can do to
27. See Pincus, The Fight Over Money, The Atlantic Monthly, April,
1966, p. 71, at 75.
28. See ibid.
29. In most of the states and in same subdivisions of states a
Republican finance committee collects funds which are in turn
allocated to the national committee, to the state committee, and
to other campaign committees acc6rding to their relative need. -
This mode of operation reduces, although it has by no means
entirely eliminated, the multiple solicitation of the same indi-
vidual for contributiqns to different, party committees. .J
Ki, op. cit. supra note 10, at 548.
30. See ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 33.
31. The ideological split contributed t6 the lack- of fiational party
funds, Since most contributions from Goldwater supporters went into
non-party committees, and most large contributors in the "eastern es-
tablishment" donated their money elsewhere. Pincus, supra note 27, at
74.
32. See id. at 73-74 for a description of the efforts of Ray Bliss,
Republican National Committee Chairman. "Last year, more than three
million mail appeals brought in $1.7 million .... " New York Times,
Feb. 20, 1966, p. 47, col. 1.
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unify the party fiscally is to provide supplemental services,
such as research and advertising, and, for a few key candidates,
donate money or swing some contributions towards them
which they would not otherwise receive. "But the assistance is
usually a product of mutual respect and mutual interests already
existing, and not of an effort to build party solidarity."3 3 Thus
it may be said that unified fund raising acts as a significant
unifying influence only so long as it can supply more funds than
any other source; and so long as the national parties lack a broad,
continuing financial base, they cannot fulfill their goal of main-
taining unified parties.
D. FmAwCiAL NEEDS
That politics today is expensive is a truism, 34 but one should
not be misled by it. Actually, most of the increased cost of cam-
paigning is attributable to the increased size of the electorate.
The cost per vote probably has remained almost stable because
of the availability of mass communications media.35
The greatest financial need is that of an individual candidate
when running for nomination.36 Unless a candidate is an in-
cumbent or is "politically connected," he must depend upon in-
efficient short-lived political committees, which usually lack ex-
perienced fund raisers and lists of contributors. He must also
overcome hesitancy of contributors who are unwilling to donate
unless they think he has a good chance of nomination3T Few
worthwhile candidates will run for nomination unless fairly
sure of sufficient financial and public support.38
The only alternative for a candidate who cannot raise enough
money from the public to wage an effective nomination campaign
33. HEARD, op. cit. supra note 23, at 259-60.
34. See Hearings on S. 227, 604, 1555 and 1623 and S. Res. 141,
Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Com-
mittee on Rules and Administration, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
35. BuLLrr, op. cit supra note 2, at 67-68. This, however, may be
overly optimistic. The leading authority on financing of campaigns,
Herbert E. Alexander, estimates that the cost of campaigning in 1952 at
all levels totaled about $140 million. This was increased in 1956 to $155
million, in 1960 to $175 million, and finally in 1964 to over $200 million.
ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1964 ELECTION, 13 (1966).
36. See KEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 542.
37. See 1961 Hearings 199-200.
38. See Hearings Before the Special Senate Committee to Investi-
gate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions on S.
Res. 219, 84th Cong., and S. Res. 47, 85th Cong., 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1210
(1956-1957) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Hearings].
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is to be born rich. Most competent candidates, of course, are not
rich. One exception was John F. Kennedy, who expended about
one half million dollars of personal and family resources in his
campaign for nomination.39 The really unfortunate part of this
is that, while a national nomination is certainly expensive to
obtain, the proportion of this cost to the total cost of a campaign
is probably less than at the state or district level.
Once a candidate has won nomination, he can count on some
help from his party; but he still must bear the responsibility for
raising the bulk of his campaign funds himself.40 This may
result in a candidate's being "bought," although most campaigns
are well enough financed to make such "purchases" fairly rare
occurrences. 41 Unfortunately, "buying" candidates is not so rare
in nomination campaigns, where each sum of money takes on
added significance because money is so scarce and the major
sources of nomination funds are "political." Thus many candi-
dates are forced to incur unwanted obligations to special inter-
ests during nomination campaigns, while during election cam-
paigns, funds from less interested sources are available.
E. FumN RAISniG
1. Large Contributions
Although large contributions have often been condemned,
perhaps unjustly,42 because they interfere with the workings of
the democratic process,43 they still remain the largest single
source of funds for the parties and candidates. Part of the reason
seems to be that the parties have never had enough funds both to
wage a campaign and to establish a year round fund raising or-
ganization. A more important reason, however, is that the easiest
way to raise the necessary money to run a campaign without up-
setting the status quo is through 'large contributions. 44 Thus,
39. See ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 120 for examples of his
expenditures.
40. KEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 542. Although there is no doubt
that party identification helps to -raise funds, one can wonder how much
of those funds comes in because a candidate is a member of a particular
party, -and how much comes in because of his own personality now that
he is an officially recognized candidate.
41. See 1956 Hearings 1215 (Whitaker).
42. They are one means by which economic interests obtain func-
tional representation. Indeed, "The activities of fund raisers often ex-
pose more rational political alignments than do party lines." HEARD, op.
cit. supra note 23, at 247-48.
43. See BuLLrr, To BE A PoLmciUw 68 (1961).
44. For an example of the success of an appeal to large contributors,
see Pincus, supra note 27, at 74. See 1961 Hearings 144 (Morton).
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neither parties nor candidates have had much incentive to go be-
yond large contributors.
Although admittedly understated,45 figures from the 1957
Gore Committee Report, the most thorough investigation of cam-
paign spending that has been done, indicate the importance of the
large contributor. One individual alone contributed $73,164; in-
dividuals contributing over $5,000 apiece gave a total of $3,809,689;
those who contributed over $500 apiece gave a total of
$10,885,562; and 12 families contributed a total of $1,153,735.46
These figures are, however, somewhat misleading because they
do not include the "educational expenditures" on behalf of the
Democrats by labor unions.47 It should also be remembered
that since Eisenhower, who was at the peak of his popularity, was
running for re-election, the figures overemphasize the normal
disparity between resources of the Republicans and Democrats.48
2. Political Functions
Political functions, particularly dinners, have been very pop-
ular as a means of raising funds. Since a large number of din-
ners can be held at the same time and linked together by TV,
large sums of money can be raised quickly and efficiently.49
Dinners are a particularly good fund raising method because
people are more willing to contribute if their contributions are
visible to their peers.50
45. Report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the
Committee on Rules and Administration, pursuant to S. Res. 176, of the
84th Cong., 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957) [hereinafter cited as the Gore
Report].
46. Gore Report 12.
47. See dissent of Senator Curtis, id. at 25.
48. The influence a President can have on his party's fund raising
is exemplified by a recent Republican report which shows a significantly
higher percentage of large contributions by individuals to the incum-
bent's party as compared to the "out" party. See The Sunday Star,
Washington D.C., Dec. 19, 1965, p. A-18, col. 3.
49. For example, the 1960 Republicans' television linkup of eighty-
three cities for a "Dinner with Ike" netted $3,000,000. See ALEXANDER,
FINANCING THE PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNS, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN
TRANSITION, 1960-61 130 (1961). Similar dinners were held in 1965 to
celebrate Ike's 75th birthday, but netted only about $200,000. Pincus
supra note 27, at 74. Part of the reason these dinners failed to raise
substantial sums of money is that they did not occur during a campaign.
The major reasons, however, are that Eisenhower was no longer Presi-
dent, and there was no reasonable expectation that the Republicans
would come back to power in the near future.
50. See 1961 Hearings 201 (Bailey, Democratic National Committee
Chairman). This is, however, not true of those who contribute to both
sides. Indeed, one politican estimated that at least one half of those
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Such functions are also an ideal method of "hiding" corporate
contributions, particularly when the functions are combined, as
they usually have been, with an ad book. The most recent and
blatant example was the Democratic Party's plan to hold movie
premieres in congressional districts and to hand out a 178 page
extravaganza entitled "Toward an Age of Greatness." Ads were
sold at $15,000 per page to such advertisers as eleven of the top
twenty-five defense, contractors and to many industries under
government regulation or which received government subsidies.51
Such ads probably violated two or three express statutory pro-
hibitions,52 and about half the cost of each ad was paid by the
taxpayers. 3 Even though the Republicans remained silent be-
cause a dinner for Senator Everett Dirksen cleared about
$380,000,54 a great public furor arose which led to two results.
The Democrats decided to contribute the $600,000 they netted
from the ad book to a group established to conduct a nonpartisan
voter registration drive,55 rather than to use it to register Dem-
ocrats, as was originally intended.56 More important, public fu-
ror resulted in passage of a bill which prohibits a tax deduction
of the cost of tickets or ads at any affair when the proceeds are
likely to benefit any candidate for nomination or election to
local, state or national office.57 What effect this will have on the
future of such affairs is not clear. Although corporation execu-
who attended political dinners were guests of those who purchased
tables but did not attend. Whether section 276 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which prohibits deduction of the cost of political dinner tickets,
will cut too deeply into this source of funds remains to be seen. It
probably will not, since much of this money was neither reported nor
deducted.
51. See Peirce, Financing Our Parties, The Reporter, Feb. 10, 1966,
p. 29, at 34.
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. 1965) (prohibiting corporate con-
tributions); 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1950) (prohibiting contributions from firms
doing business with the federal government); 49 Stat. 823 (1935),
15 U.S.C. § 79(1) (h) (1963) (prohibiting contributions from public
utilities).
53. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction
for "reasonable business ixpenses," presumably including such adver-
tisements. Since the effective tax rate on corporations is 48%, the gov-
ernment is contributing'about half the cost. It could, however, easily
be" showi that the cost of such advertising was not reasonable under
almost any standard. The cost per thoiisand copies for such an ad was
$60, "compared with just over $5 for distribution to each thousand read-
ers of a national magazine like 'Time'."- Peirce, supra note 51, at 32.
54. See Pincus, supra note 27, 'at 73.
55. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1966, p. 48, col. 3.
56. See Peirce, supra note 51, at 34.
57. Pub. L. No. 368, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. III (March 15, 1966);
IT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 276. See § III. F. infra for further discussion.
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tives can still buy tickets as individuals, it seems certain that
this bill will dampen enthusiasm for such affairs.
3. Mass Solicitation
Direct personal solicitation is the most efficient way of raising
large amounts of money in small sums from many people.
Charities have been very successful in raising the bulk of their
money this way because they have many volunteers, charitable
donations are accepted as socially useful, and such donati6ns are
tax deductible. 58 However, these elements which -make such
charitable drives successful are not now present in political fund
raising.
Ironically, the national parties, which are most in need of
funds, are least able to mount a national door-to-door campaign.
At best, the national parties can provide publicity and co-ordinate
a national campaign for mass funds. They must rely upon local
party organizations for manpower5 9 and organization,' without
which a campaign cannot succeed. However, most local organ-
izations are hesitant to join such a campaign60 and the national
parties cannot coerce them because the ldcal organizations con-
trol the money supply.
Other problems also would have to be overcome to run a
successful fund raising campaign. If a local organization is a
personal one, there is no incentive to raise money to be spent -on
the national level. If there is a hard fight Ibcallj' all inonies
are needed in the local area. In many rural areas the population
is too thinly spread to make mass solicitation worthwhile. Many
low income urban areas have insufficient political money, avail-
able to risk walking the streets. And many local fights re-
58. IMT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170., 'But there is some aoubt as to
how influential this deduction is to most small givers, who take the
standard deduction rather than iteifizing -chrita-bl"',id 6thr de-
ductions. When taken in conjunction with social-approval of such
donations, however, there is probably some significant psychological
impact.
59. [A] paradox exists; manpower .rather than money. may be
a more important factor in winning elections, 'but rnoney .is
needed in part because there is not enough.manpower; money'is
needed in part to buy services that are not volunteered. Yet to
raise funds from a broad base requires manpower not otherwise'
readily available.
ALE XADER, REsPoxsiBxriTY iN PARTY FnANcE 30 (1963):
60. In most local committees, a few politicians who perform all the
tasks and receive all the recognition and power do not want volunteers
to upset the status quo. Nor do they want' to risk threatening their
established sources of money or share 'the money they raise with the
national party. See ALEXANDER, op. cit..supra note 49, at 146-48.
19661
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
quire more money than can be raised locally.
In view of these difficulties, the President's Commission on
Campaign Costs "doubted that the parties could in the near
future organize themselves to collect enough money in truly
small amounts to meet necessary campaign costs." 61 Although
this problem may exist at least on the national level, the parties
should start to organize such programs. Even if the effort were
not financially successful, it would operate effectively to ac-
tivate large numbers of supporters. Not only would small con-
tributors be likely to feel a vested interest in the success of their
party, they would also probably endeavor to share their partisan
views. Such an effort could also accomplish the additional de-
sirable result of reaching a large untapped pool of funds. A
Gallup poll taken in 1961 indicates that between twelve and se-
venteen million families would contribute five dollars or more
if asked to do so. 62 Although the results are probably somewhat
high because the answer "yes" is a prestige answer, the potential
pool would swell as political giving became more respectable.
The national Dollars for Democrats fund raising campaign is
often cited to show the futility of such mass personal solicitations
because only $121,060 reached the Democratic National Com-
mittee.68 But one committee, in Minnesota, showed what could
be done if solicitation were seriously attempted: it raised its
collection from $40,000 in 1958 to $94,000 in 1960.64
To be successful, a fund raising drive should have local
solicitors, be partisan, take place when partisan feeling is high,
and be co-ordinated with a publicity campaign to make political
contributions respectable. Getting publicity, at least in presi-
dential election years, should not be difficult.6 5 However, in
nonpresidential election years there is less interest, less adver-
tising, and consequently less money raised. Although there may
61. UNrrED STATES PRESIDENT'S CommIssIoN ON CAMPAIGN COSTS,
FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 17 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
PRESIDENT'S CO1MMVISSION].
62. See 1961 Hearings 34.
63. ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 134.
64. Ibid.
65. In 1960 the Ametic n Heritage Foundation and the Advertising
Council contributed $12 million of free advertising which urged citizens
to contribute to and vote for the party of their choice. This seems to
have had an effect on the percentage of voters who contributed. In 1952
only 4% contributed; this increased to 10% in 1956 and to 11.5% in 1960.
ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 133. These figures, though over-
optimistic, may indicate a trend toward making political contributions
socially acceptable, which could have tremendous fiscal and organiza-
tional implications for the parties.
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be some cumulative effect from advertising, and the need for
money may be less because no national campaign has to be
mounted, this is little solace to the candidate who might have to
resort to "fat cats" for money needed to run his campaign. Per-
haps the answer lies in a continuing publicity and fund raising
drive which would help raise money in off year elections.
Solicitation should be partisan because it is easier to get par-
tisans to volunteer. 6 For the same reasons, solicitation should
take place when partisan feeling is high.67 Although partisan
feeling is highest just before the election, it is too late to solicit
because most of the money should be spent at that time, not
collected. The most practical time is approximately two weeks
before the election, when money is available early enough so
that it can be spent rationally, and partisan feeling has a chance
to grow without becoming stale.
Direct mail solicitation may be the easiest way to build a
national party membership which can keep the national parties
supplied with enough money in small sums to limit significantly
the influence of large contributors. Although the parties in the
past have expressed doubts as to whether the effort involved
was worth the return,68 and the Democrats have not had much
success with direct mail solicitation, 9 the Republicans have
made this a mainstay of national support, receiving over $5.8
million in the fall of 1966.70
Nor, apparently, is the success of the Republican effort mere-
ly a response to special conditions, such as Senator Barry Gold-
water's campaign, because in 1965 three million mail appeals
brought in $1.7 million.71 The Republican National Committee,
at least, is convinced that this is not a temporary phenomenon.
They expect forty per cent of the Committee's 1966 budget of
$6.1 million to come from six million letters seeking ten dollar
contributions. 72 In addition to increased participation of a mass
of people and the independence the Committee has acquired, the
plan has proven to be an inexpensive means of raising money.73
66. See 1956 Hearings 1212 (Whitaker).
67. See id. at 1214 (Whitaker).
68. See 1961 Hearings 192 (Bailey).
69. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Elections of the Com-
mittee on House Administration on H.R. 9255, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 45
(1962) [hereinafter cited as the 1962 Hearings] (Bailey).
70. See Pincus, The Fight Over Money, The Atlantic Monthly,
April, 1966, p. 71, at 72.
71. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1966, p. 47, col. 1.
72. Ibid.
73. See id. at p. 47, col. 1.
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In unusual circumstances, direct mail can also be used to
provide emergency cash from large contributors. 4 Usually such
sums are raised by making contributors members of a special
club, such as the President's Club.7 5
.. Television 'appeals for funds have been used, as have tele-
phone solicitations, but to be successful both must occur during
the height of a campaign. In 1964 in response "to one half-hour
appeal and several shorter appeals by John Wayne and Ronald
Reagan, more than $2 million was collected within five days be-
fore the electionY.7 6  Nomination campaign telephone blitzes
at key times were also used to raise a substantial portion of the
$5.5 million spent in winning the 1964 Republican nomination.7 7
Such techniques will, however, probably not succeed when par-
tisan feeling is quiescent, during nonelection years or for candi-
dates for less important offices than the Presidency.78
Use of corporations as bipartisan conduits for employee
contributions has been suggested as a means of generating small
contributions. The results achieved by some corporations which
have put. on full scale campaigns show the enormous potential
inherent in such programs: Aerojet-General raised $136,000 in
1964, an increase in the average contribution from $4 in 1962 to
$6.85 in 1964; Hughes Aircraft Company received an average
contribution of $13.76 from twenty-six per cent of its total per-
sonnel; and G.E.'s Cleveland drive generated an average gift of
$15.33,. although this represents only slightly more than fifty
cents per employee.7 9 The only adverse reaction to these pro-
posals seems to come from politically active unions which fear
these activities will cut into their own fund raising drives. In
view of the ease of mounting such drives among these captive
audiences, and their potential value, it seems evident that corpo-
rations should be encouraged to sponsor them. Perhaps allowing
a corporation to deduct the cost of such a program would be
sufficient incentive.8 0 One caveat should be noted, however. It
74. See Pincus, supra note 70, at 74.
75. In 1964 this organization had 3,801 members, each having con-
tributed over $1,000. ALEXANDER, FNANCING = 1964 ELECTION 137
(1966).
76. Pincus, supra note 70, at 72.
77. Ibid.
78. See The Boston Globe, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 3, col. 4, for the dis-
appointing experience of Congressman Wright.
79. ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 75, at 104-07.
80. See notes 222, 225, 319 infra. :Rev. Rul. 156, 1962-2 Cum. BULL.
47, seems to allow such a deduction, seems correct as a matter of
policy. Few corporations, however, have made use of it, perhaps be-
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is essential that an employer be unaware of the party to whom
his employee is contributing, else there is too great a danger of
abuse.
4. Quotas
The effectiveness of quotas-shares assigned to each state
party for financial support of the national party-varies greatly.
For example, although Nevada's Republicans improved their
quota performance from forty-two per cent in 1960 to 262 per cent
of the 1964 quota, New York Republican contributions dropped
from 132 per cent of the 1960 quota to sixty-two per cent of the
1964 quota.8 ' The Democrats, on the other hand, now that they
have a consumate politician as President, have abandoned the
whole quota system and presently negotiate with each state party
for support of the national party.8 2 Effectiveness of a quota sys-
tem probably depends on whether the party has captured the
Presidency 3 or whether the Presidential candidate strongly ap-
peals to a moneyed group within the party. Thus quotas, in and of
themselves, probably only constitute a measure of the parties'
popularity and do not, by their mere existence, significantly in-
crease contributions.
5. Candidate's Pocketbook
We come now to the poor candidate whose pocketbook is usu-
ally the source of a substantial portion of his expenditures.8 4
Unfortunately such expenditures cannot be deducted as a rea-
sonable business expense from his income tax, 5 nor can they be
amortized as a capital investment over the term of his office.8 6
Although the reasoning given by the courts is contradictory,
support for this result may be drawn from the Internal Revenue
Code.8 7 If one were inclined to be cynical, the result could be
cause of a general unawareness of the ruling or uncertainty as to its
effect. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 276.
81. ALEXAqDER, op. cit. supra note 75, at 74.
82. Id. at 76.
83. One indication of the potential of such a scheme to a party
which captures the Presidency is that in 1961, four Democratic state
committees, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California, agreed to
a substantial increase of quota payments to $250,000 each. ALExAimER,
op. cit. supra note 49, at 142.
84. See BuLrr, To BE A PoLIrciAx 68 (1961). This may force the
candidate to incur "obligations" if the necessary money is to be raised
and modernization encouraged.
85. McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
86. Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953).




attributed to Congress' intent to give an additional advantage to
the incumbent, who does have many deductible activities even
during a campaign. 8  This seems unjustifiable in theory and
result. A much better solution is to be found in the Minnesota
statutes which allow a candidate to deduct unreimbursed expend-
itures from gross income subject to state tax, up to the statutory
amounts of permissible spending.8 9
F. INEFFECTIVE REFORM EFFORTS
In almost every session of Congress, bills to reform the Cor-
rupt Practices Act are introduced. Almost as often the Senate
passes a reform bill, but it gets lost in the House.9 0 The impor-
tance the House has attached to election reform is exemplified
by the handling of S. 2436, which was passed by a large majority
in the Senate in January, 1960, but was not given its half day
hearing in the Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on
House Administration until three days before adjournment.91
Perhaps the only reason the bill got a hearing in the committee is
attributable to the party leaders' public pronouncement of sup-
port.92
Ineffective reform efforts were not due entirely to legislative
hypocrisy; the "organization of campaign activity presents al-
most insurmountable technical obstacles to the control of fi-
nance."93 The fact remains, however, that it is to the advantage
of most members of the House to keep the statutes as they are.
Incumbents have many built-in advantages, such as free pub-
licity, staffs which are paid by the government, and free mailing
privileges. Thus, limitations on spending, no matter how theo-
retical, benefit incumbents far more than challengers. Another
reason, which is probably more important, is that most campaign
receipts and expenditures go unreported, since intrastate com-
88. E.g., the cost of printing and mailing a report of a Congress-
man's activities with a "brief personal message" is fully deductible, even
if done during a campaign. I.T. 4095, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 90.
89. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. 290.09(2) (c) (Supp. 1965).
90. The one exception is the Williams' Amendment to the Tax
Adjustment Act of 1966 which prohibits corporate purchases of tickets
or advertisements, proceeds of which might inure to the benefit of a
political party or candidate. Pub. L. No. 368, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., tit.
HI, § 276, (March 15, 1966); INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 276. See § IV.
A. I. infra for discussion. But see note 344 infra.
91. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Elections of the Com-
mittee on House Administration, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1960).
92. 1962 Hearings 42 (Bailey's statement in support of the bill).
93. KEY, PoLiTics, PARTI s, AND PRussuRE GRouPs 552 (4th ed. 1958).
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mittees need not report under the present federal statute 4 This
is a particularly appealing provision for members of the House
because of the old axiom-the smaller the constituency, the more
important a given sum of money becomes-and few congressmen
want their contributors publicized for fear of scaring away scarce
sources of money.
It must be recognized, however, that such a cynical explana-
tion would not account for the behavior of all members of the
House. Probably the basic conservatism of the House about
changing the structure of society is a more important reason.
In this area, such conservatism is not unjustified because of the
serious effects which could result from ill-considered changes.
But it is just as apparent that this conservatism has been carried
too far; it is breeding disrespect for the law.05 Possible bad
effects of change should not be used as a justification for refusing
to change those parts of the law which are universally evaded,
such as the limitation on the amount of money a political commit-
tee can receive.96
Ir GOALS
A. ELnMATION OF CORRUPT INFLUENCES AND OBLIGATIONS
Everyone wants to eliminate "corrupt" influences and obli-
gations. No one, however, seems to want to define the term "cor-
rupt." Probably the most fruitful definitional source is in the
context of democratic theory, where actions which are likely to
result in political "favoritism" taking precedence over the public
welfare are corrupt. "Favoritism" can then be defined as actions
influenced by considerations other than providing the most bene-
fit to the most people. Favoritism is considered wrongful per se
because it impairs confidence in government by disappointing ex-
pectations held by the electorate of evenhanded treatment by
government according to known rules of law. Favoritism thus
constitutes a breach of a fiduciary position and may encourage
the wrong type of candidate to run for public office.
Since favoritism cannot be eliminated altogether, the goal
94. 43 Stat. 1071 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 244 (1964) (political committees
required to report); 43. Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1964) ("po-
litical committee" is only an interstate committee or a branch of a
national committee). Although candidates are supposed to report money
contributed or spent by them or others, if they have knowledge of it,
43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1964), these provisions are totally
ineffective. See § III. C. infra.
95. See generally PaRsraEe's Com1mIssioN.
96. See § III. D. infra.
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should be to contain it within those bounds which will best keep
society functioning at maximum feasible efficiency. The initial
premise is that
There is nothing evil per se about expenditures of funds upon
elections. Indeed, if the electorate is to make a wise choice, then
the issues of a contest, the records aind views of opposing candi-
dates, should receive wide dissemination .... The evil which
threatens our elective processes arises from the improper use
of the money, money in excessive amounts, sometimes from
questionable sources, and heavily in favor of special interest
candidates, or without full disclosure to the public. 97
Bribery, which involves a quid pro quo, is clearly corrupt.
Although rarely occurring, it should be severely punished. The
line between campaign contributions and bribery may be so fine
as to be invisible, but it need not be of concern, except insofar as
a penalty is concerned. If a contribution falls close to this line,
it would almost by definition be outside permissible bounds.
So also are contributions98 from illegal sources, such as organ-
ized crime, which by definition is given to subverting enforce-
ment of law, and which often drives away competent candi-
dates.99 Although it has been estimated that as much as fifteen
per cent of total contributions come from the underworld,10 0
it may be questioned, perhaps with tongue in check, whether
candidates know of the sources, because they never receive any
"dirty" money; it is always the other fellow who is so compro-
mised.10 '
The more important issues, however, concern ordinary con-
tributions, which are given primarily to gain access to the "inner
workings" of government in order to enable a contributor effec-
tively to present his arguments. While it might be contended
that this is a perversion of democratic processes, 0 2 it is a fact of
life which probably helps as much as it harms the political sys-
tem. The really significant question concerns the degree of in-
fluence which should be permitted to be exerted: whether contri-
butions should be allowed from otherwise legitimate groups,
and how much money can be contributed by an individual or
group before a presumption of favoritism arises. The answer de-
pends in part upon the existence of other sources of funds.
Althoughthese questions will be discussed in detail below, suf-
97. 1961 Hearings 50-51 (Senator Gore).
98. This includes not only money but, more importantly, workers.
See Boston Herald, Dec. 2, 1961, p. 1, col. 3.
99. See LEvIN, THE COMPLEAT POLrTICIAN 242 (1962).
100. HEARD, THE CosTs OF DEMocRAcY 142 (Anchor ed. 1962).
101. See LEvn, op. cit. supra note 99, at 236.
102. See BULLiT, To BE A POLITITION 68 (1961).
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fice it to say for now that the problem revolves around the
proposition that, although politicians should and do behave in
the common interest when perceived, the difficulty of discern-
ing the common interest too often leads to prevalence of more
concrete interests closer to home.
B. ENCOURAGING COMPETENT CANDIDATES WITHOUT MON=x
The system under which we currently finance our campaigns
is inadequate because it precludes Americans of limited finan-
cial resources from serving in elective office .... [A]s the
cost of campaigning increases, it becomes an almost unwritten
amendment to the Constitution that only those Americans with
money, or access to it, are able to participate in governing.' 03
The correction of this weakness should be one of the prime
goals of any election reform. However, attaining this goal will
be very difficult, since at the time of the most crucial need for
money-the nomination campaign-the most obvious source of
money, the parties, cannot intervene. 0 4  Somehow people must
be encouraged to contribute to candidates with limited access to
money. Otherwise many competent candidates will not run or
will be forced to incur obligations they would like to avoid. 0 5
Government subsidy is the only other alternative and may
prove to be the most feasible. 0 6
C. STRUCTURE vs. SACTIONS
Unfortunately, the rationale underlying present campaign
regulation "assumes that its prime task is to prevent expendi-
tures of too much money in political campaigns.' ' 0 7 Perhaps
this suspicion "stems from an idealized view of the American
voter as a 'free agent' better able to select the 'best man' with-
out propaganda distractions, plus the fear that unchecked elec-
tion financing opens the doors to purchases of favors by monied
interests."'0 But whether these premises are valid is irrelevant
because the present statutory scheme based on sanctions, which
are never or so rarely enforced that candidates can safely ignore
103 1961 Hearings 76 (Senator Neuberger).
104. This situation would occur unless, as in Massachusetts and Min-
nesota, the primary occurs after the party convention. But even here
the parties justly hesitate to interfere because often each primary con-
testant controls large blocks of party support.
105. See BuLLrr, op. cit. supra note 102, at 68.
106. See § IV. B. infra.
107. Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A
Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 998 (1953).
108. Id. at 977-78.
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them, has served only to make people contemptuous of the
law. 109
Reform can take one of two courses of action: it can attempt
to structure the situation so that it is within campaigners' inter-
ests to stay inside permissible grounds, or it can impose effec-
tive sanctions in an attempt to prevent impermissible action.1" 0
Since the sanction approach has not worked well, it would seem
that effective reform will have to rely primarily upon structur-
ing rather than sanctions. By using sanctions selectively and
emphasizing structuring, it should be possible to eliminate most
"corrupt practices" and to improve the quality of campaign-
ing. The goal to be sought is not to limit the amount of money
spent, but rather "to remove, not create, barriers to divergent
group expression, and, more positively, to bare to public view
party support and policies.""'
D. CoNsTITuTIoNAL LIMITATIONS
State interest in its own elections is no impediment to federal
control of contributions to candidates for federal office. Al-
though it could be claimed that the rule still is that Congress
has no general power over state and local elections,1 2 it would
also have to be admitted that the general rule has been swal-
lowed by exceptions. As early as 1888 the Supreme Court up-
held a federal indictment of a state official who interfered with
ballots cast in an election for state and federal offices, although
the official did not intend to influence the federal election." 3
In Burroughs & Cannon v. United Statesn1 the Supreme Court
held that in order to protect its own officers the federal govern-
ment has the power to "safeguard such an election from the
improper use of money."" 5 Indeed, it has been suggested that
These decisions, and the fact that the Federal Government is
now permitted to control some state election activities on such
diverse grounds as the power over interstate commerce, the con-
trol over federal employees, and the disposition of federal funds,
make it clear that there is no inviolable and exclusive state in-
terest in its own elections."6
109. See Gore Report 3.
110. See Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incentive for
Small Contributors, 18 LA. L. Rnv. 414, 420 (1958).
111. Bicks & Friedman, supra note 107, at 998.
112. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875).
113. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
114. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
115. Id. at 545.
116. Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1259, 1262 (1953). This conclusion is
further borne out by the cases, see e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
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There are, however, other more serious constitutional limita-
tions to reform efforts, particularly those based upon disclosure,
since the first amendment might constrict the permissible sphere
of action. Since these limitations are applicable to specific pro-
posals, they will be discussed under appropriate headings.
III. PRESENT STATUTORY CONTROLS
A. ScoPE OF COVERAGE
Present federal statutes, except for prohibition of certain
specific contributions 1 7 and publication or distribution of un-
signed political statements,11 cover only elections to Congress,1 9
political committees operating in more than one state, and
branches of national committees. 20  They specifically do not
cover nominating primaries,' 2' most political committees oper-
ating in only one state,' 22 and presidential and vice-presidential
candidates. 123
There was some justification for excluding primaries from
coverage when the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was first
passed, since it had been held that Congress' power over elec-
tions did not extend to primaries. 24 This case was, however,
overruled by Classic v. United States. 25  The real question is
383 U.S. 301 (1966), which have arisen under the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 79 Stat. 437 (1965), 42 U.S.C.A. 1971 (Supp. I. 1965).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1964) ($5,000 limitation on individual contribu-
tions); 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1964) (prohibition on union and corporate
contributions); 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1964) (those contracting with the United
States forbidden to contribute); 49 Stat. 823 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(1) (h)
(1964) (public utility holding companies prohibited from making po-
litical contributions).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1964).
119. "The term 'election' includes a general or special election, but
does not include a primary election or convention of a political party
.... " 60 Stat. 1352 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1964). "The term 'can-
didate' means an individual whose name is presented at an election for
election as Senator or Representative in ... the Congress of the United
States, whether or not such individual is elected .... ." 43 Stat. 1070
(1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241(b) (1964). These provisions are substantially
identical to the provisions found in 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1964).
120. 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1964). This is precisely
the same provision as 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1964).
121. See note 119 supra.
122. See note 120 supra. No one, however, seems to have attempted
to distinguish between subsidiary and state committees.
123. See note 119 supra (definition of "candidate"). However, inter-
state committees supporting them must report. See note 120 supra and
accompanying text.
124. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
125. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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why Congress, in light of its extended powers, did not extend the
coverage of at least the later statutes to include primaries. Cov-
erage has in certain instances been so extended,'126 even before
Classic,2 7 but the basic coverage remains the same. Unfortun-
ately, the most probable answer is that Congress did not want
to pass an effective control on campaign contributions. When
Congress has been serious about controls, it has extended cover-
age to include primaries.128  However, the most encompassing
and simple control on campaign contributions occurs, not in
statutes dealing specifically with that subject, but in provisions
dealing with regulation of securities and holding companies.120
B. LIITATION ON INDIVDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Whoever, directly or indirectly, makes contributions in an
aggregate amount in excess of $5,000 during any calendar year,
or in connection with any campaign for nomination or election,
to or on behalf of any candidate for an elective Federal office,
including the offices of President of the United States and Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential electors, or to or on behalf of
any committee or other organization engaged in furthering,
advancing, or advocating the nomination or election of any candi-
date for any such office or the success of any national political
party, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
This subsection shall not apply to contributions made to or
by a State or local committee or other State or local organiza-
tion or to similar committees or organizations in the District of
Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United
States.130
Although this section was added after the Classic'3' decision
and applies to primaries and party conventions, as well as gen-
eral and special elections, it continues to exclude state and
local committees from coverage. Thus a contributor can donate
as much as he wants to state and local committees; he can con-
tribute the maximum to as many committees as he pleases;
132
126. See notes 117 and 118 supra and accompanying text.
127. 313 U.S. 299 (1941); see 49 Stat. 823 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(1)
(h) (1964) (prohibition of all contributions by public utility holding
companies). Although this was based upon the power over interstate
commerce and was upheld on this ground, Egan v. United States, 137
F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943), rather than on Congress' power over elections,
it shows what Congress can accomplish when it has a mind to do so.
128. See e.g., note 127 supra; 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. 1964) (prohibi-
tion of union or corporate contributions "in connection with" elections
or primaries).
129. See note 127 supra.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1964).
131. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
132. It should be noted, however, that a California court interpreted
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or he can give money to members of his family for them to
contribute.13 3  The reason for this exception is not clear. Per-
haps Congress felt that regulation of state and local committees
belonged within the province of state law. In view, however, of
Congress' knowledge of the use which is made of this loophole,
the ineffectiveness of state laws,'1 34 and other provisions which
"invade the states' province,"' 35 this suggestion is not persuasive.
Unfortunately, a more accurate reason probably is that Congress
had no compunction about imposing this easily avoided limit
on those who contribute to national parties or Presidential com-
mittees, but wanted no part of a law which could affect the
prime source of congressmen's support-local committees. Con-
tributions to local committees supporting congressional candi-
dates are supposed to be controlled by publicity attendant to
filing required reports. 13 6 This has not, however, turned out
to be the case, since there is no enforcement, and the reports,
even if filed, are often incomplete and chaotic.
By limiting the amount a person can contribute, this section
might violate a person's first amendment right to free speech
and to associate with others in propagating shared views. 3 7
a similar statute to prohibit such a series of gifts. Mathewson v. Bean,
114 Cal. App. 519, 522, 300 Pac. 56, 57 (1931).
133. The $3,000 exemption from the federal gift tax seems to be a
stronger factor in limiting campaign contributions than this paper tiger.
See 1961 Hearings 201 (Bailey); INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 2521.
134. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 16 (Supp. 1965) (candidate
must file statement). The ineffectiveness of this law was demonstrated
in the campaigns of Edward Kennedy and Edward McCormack for elec-
tion to the United States Senate, where neither candidate came close to
complying with disclosure requirements. This is hardly an enviable
record, despite the quality of the candidates. See LE iN, Krm y CAm-
PAIGNING (1966). For a complete list of state recording statutes, see
ALEXANDER & DENNY, REGULATION or PoLrrIcAL FINANCE 55 (1966).
135. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 602, 608, 610, 612; 49 Stat. 823 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
§ 79(1) (h) (1964).
136. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1964).
137. This is particularly applicable to the provision which absolutely
prohibits anyone negotiating or performing a contract with the federal
government from contributing. 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1964). See § III. F.
infra for discussion.
The Republicans have chosen an interesting manner of dealing with
this possible objection: they would limit to $5,000 the amount anyone
can contribute to a candidate or committee supporting a candidate, but
would set no limit on the amount a person could contribute to party
committees. See H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (a) (1966). How-
ever, this still leaves, admittedly in mitigated form, the problem of large
contributors garnering excess influence. Perhaps narrowing this gap
by allowing large contributions to be made to the national party com-
mittees in addition to those made to candidates would be much more
justifiable. But even this would not alleviate the basic problem that
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Since the protection of free speech extends to many means of
influencing public opinion, which is the very purpose of protect-
ing free speech, it would seem that financial contributions aimed
at influencing public opinion should be protected. This is par-
ticularly true during elections when free speech is most essen-
tial and effective. On the other hand, it might be contended
that this provision does not unduly prevent a person from ex-
pressing his opinion; rather it protects the integrity of the elec-
tion processes by allowing the electorate to choose between can-
didates who do not owe anything to hidden interests.
There is some judicial indication that reasonable election
regulations which impinge upon ability to sway the public may
be upheld, although these decisions, being limited to corpora-
tions, can be distinguished from cases involving individuals. 13
Like most constitutional questions this is probably a question of
degree, and the answer is most likely to be found in application
of the provision. If there is a significant danger that contribu-
tions over $5,000, for instance, may deprive voters of ability to
choose between free agents, then such a provision is probably
constitutional. On the other hand, if $5,000 does not endanger
the electoral process because it constitutes only a small portion
of the money raised from other large contributions or prefer-
ably from mass contributions, this provision is probably uncon-
stitutional. Constitutionality of this provision may also depend
upon who is subject to its enforcement: it might be constitutional
if applied to congressional campaign contributors, but not if
applied to Presidential campaign contributors. 3 9 However, such
$5,000 per candidate, even though it encompasses both nomination and
election campaigns, seems an excessive amount. Surely the opinion of
a $5,000 contributor to a congressman could have excessive weight.
138. Although corporations have an economic interest in the out-
come of elections, they are artificial entities representing a certain num-
ber of voters. And since no voter may exercise greater influence than
any other voter, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), corporate elec-
tion activity may be absolutely prohibited, cf. United States v. United
States Brewers Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916) (dictum). Another
possible distinguishing factor is that minority shareholders would be
forced to contribute to candidates they oppose. See IAM v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961) (applying this rationale to unions); Kallenbach, The
Taft-Hartley Act and Union Political Contributions and Expenditures, 33
MNN. L. REv. 1 (1948) (intent of proponents of 18 U.S.C. § 610). See
also § Ill. E. infra for cases upholding restraints on unions, which may
rest upon the same bases as those upholding corporate restrictions.
However, the wisdom of ignoring group influence, which may be the
only way to assert an individual's views, is another matter.
139. Roughly, a contribution of $1,000 at the congressional level may




an interpretation may run afoul of the law's need for certainty,
and thus a court might very well hold the statute must stand or
fall as it is applied to any reasonable situation.
Section 608(b) which absolutely prohibits sale of goods if the
proceeds thereof inure to the benefit of any federal candidate for
election or a political committee supporting a candidate for nomi-
nation or election,140 suffers from the same infirmities to an
even greater degree. No justification for such an absolute pro-
hibition or for exempting candidates for nomination from the
provisions of this section is to be found in either the statute or
the legislative history. It might therefore be concluded that the
section is an unconstitutional infringement upon expression. 14
1
Actually, this discussion is merely academic, since these
sections have almost never been enforced, nor are they likely to
be enforced in the future because of the political implications
of their criminal sanctions. Even if an attempt were made to
enforce the provisions, they could be so easily evaded that the
effort would be futile.1 42
Reform is clearly needed if the goal of limiting influence of
large contributors is to be achieved. The greatest danger from
such large contributors is their ability to influence political deci-
sions concerning unforeseen situations arising after an elec-
tion. Their contributions gain them access to politicians, which,
in conjunction with the information, time, and money avail-
able to large contributors, leads to an advantage in the attempt to
make an effective presentation of their views.
To be effective, law must be enforceable, that is, there
must be a desire and an ability to compel compliance. Be-
cause of the sensitivity of the issue of campaign contributions,
the only sanctions that can reasonably be expected to be en-
forced are those which are applicable to contributions which are
clearly unreasonable. 143 Control of contributions which are not
140. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1964). The provision, however, "shall not
interfere with the usual and known business, trade, or profession of any
candidate."
141. Most of the reform bills have tried to attack the problem by
allowing sales of campaign paraphenalia which cost less than $5. E.g.,
S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(d) (1966) (President Johnson's bill)
and H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(d) (1966) (Republican bill
which is basically the same but clarifies a candidate's right to continue
in his customary business).
142. See Gore Report 4.
143. For example, the situation might be structured so that any
unpublicized contribution over a certain amount is per se unreasonable.
This would eliminate all problems of showing intent to "corrupt" by
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so clearly unreasonable must rest upon devices other than legal
sanctions, such as publicity.
Reasonableness is a rather elusive factor. Contributions
from the underworld are unreasonable, without regard to
amount, because they are aimed at subverting the law. Sanc-
tions should be the means of controlling such contributions be-
cause no other alternatives would be effective. Unfortunately,
even sanctions are not likely to be effective. Laws imposing
sanctions must be strictly construed to protect innocent parties,
and underworld contributions are extremely difficult to iden-
tify as such. All unpublicized contributions could be made
criminal, but unless limited to fairly large contributions, such a
proposal would be too Draconian to be enforceable. Although
sanctions should be available, probably the only real remedy is
to supply enough money from other sources so that candidates
can refuse underworld money or unpublicized cash without se-
verely injuring their campaigns.
One of the reasons that effective limitations have not been
passed is that few congressmen are altruistic enough about elec-
tion reform to risk injuring their major sources of funds.144
If a contributor can only give a limited sum of money, that
means congressional, senatorial, and national committees are all
in competition for that money; whereas, if reasonable separate
limits were established for each level,145 the only competition
setting up an arbitrary, but simple and easily enforceable standard. One
penalty should be provided for inadvertent breach of this standard and
another for intentional breach. If the level of reportable contributions
were set high enough so that it would be likely that contributors would
know of the statute's requirements, and the penalty for an unintentional
breach were not set at Draconian levels, problems of enforcing such a
statute should be fairly simple. The largest problem would then be dis-
covering violations and initiating prosecutions.
144. President Johnson's proposal would have imposed an aggre-
gate limit of $5,000 in any one year or campaign. S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 102 (1966). Other proposals would limit individual contributions
to an aggregate of $10,000 per year for'all federal offices, including the
presidency. S. 604 § 302, S. 2436 § 302, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
Others would place the limit as low as $1,000. S. 1623 § 302, S. 604
§ 302, H.R. 2396 § 302, H.R. 33 § 302, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). And
still others would leave the limits as they are now. S. 2426 § 302, H.R.
9255 § 302, 87th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1961-1962). Interestingly
enough, the Senate rejected by voice vote an amendment to S. 2426
which would have placed a ceiling of $20,000 a year on individual con-
tributions. 107 CONG. REc. 19665 (1961). The reason for such rejection
is, however, not clear.
' 145. The major weakness in such proposals, however, is that they
do not cope with problems of allocating contributions to candidates
within multi-candidate committees, which serve the function of pro-
[Vol. 51:1
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
would be between candidates for nomination and nominees.
If proper limits were drawn, they might help to allay fears of
congressmen that their campaigns would be financially starved
by limitations, while protecting the public against undue influ-
ence exerted upon candidates. Such a statute might even en-
courage mass contributions, which are the ultimate means of con-
trolling undue influence. 146
People should be able to contribute some money to candi-
dates in other states, since they may advocate a policy which the
contributor favors. On the other hand, the people of a state are
entitled to a candidate who, subject to national needs, will repre-
sent their interests instead of those of someone outside the
state.147 One proposal would limit an extraterritorial contribu-
tion to a candidate for the Senate or the House to $250, and na-
tional party committees would be limited to a $10,000 contribu-
tion to a senatorial candidate and $3,000 to a congressional
candidate.148  The first part of the proposal seems worthwhile,
although it is probably unenforceable as a practical matter. But
the second part would seem only to inhibit development of re-
sponsible parties by limiting one of the few means of encouraging
party unity.
Finally, there is a question whether absolute prohibition of
political contributions by federal employees should be contin-
ued.14 9 Although there is some complaint, particularly in the
moting party unity. Allocation could be based on the proportion of
money spent by the committee for each candidate, but this is an event
'after the fact and might cause an individual unknowingly to exceed his
limit. Perhaps one could allocate along arbitrary lines: if a committee
supports two candidates, contributions would be allocated equally. But
this is an invitation to avoid the limitation by forming one committee
to support a candidate who needs money and one who does not. A more
likely solution, however, is prohibition of contributions by one person
to more than one committee supporting a candidate, excepting, of course,
the national party committee or a designated state party committee.
.There should be no problem under the first amendment because an
individual could still contribute to whichever candidate he wishes. This
,solution should also increase party strength and, by eliminating a pri-
,mary reason for the present plethora of committees, should ease prob-
lems of control.
146. See Bicks & Friedman, supra note 107, at 999. See also Bot-
.tomly, Corrupt Practices in Political Campaigns, 30 B.U.L. REV. 331, 350(1950).
147. Cf. Gore Report 5; 1961 Hearings 52.
148. S. 1623, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1961). This statute would
also have limited individual aggregate contributions to $1,000.
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 607 (1964). Bailey, Chairman of the National
Democratic Party Committee, has complained that federal employees




Washington, D.C. enclave, that the restriction inhibits good gov-
ernment,'5" the statute has worked very well in removing federal
employees from possible political pressures. Perhaps, however,
some limited exceptions might cautiously be tried, such as allow-
ing an aggregate contribution of $100 to local and state cam-
paigns.
All of these proposals can be evaded if the desire is strong
enough, although certain things can be done to make evasion
more difficult. The contributor who reasonably expects to con-
tribute a yearly total over $100 should be required each time he
contributes to swear, under penalty of perjury, that the money
he is contributing is his own' 51 and that he has not exceeded
statutory limits. Further, anyone who contributes in the aggre-
gate more than a total of $500 in a single year should be required
to report those contributions to a central depository. 52 Prohib-
iting contributions over $100 per year by minors would eliminate
excessive contributions through the medium of the family.
Whether the benefits of such proposals are worth the problems
of administration is quite another matter. As a practical matter
they probably are not. The only real solution to the problem
of undue influence from large contributors is not to impose sanc-
tions, but to provide adequate funds supplied either by mass con-
tributions'5 3 or by direct government subsidy.
C. LIITATION ON CANDIDATE ExPEzDrruPxs
Under the present statute no candidate for United States
Senator may spend more than $25,000, and no candidate for the
House of Representatives may spend more than $5,000 on their
respective campaigns. 154 Although these sums do not include
certain major enumerated expenses, such as travel, stationery,
150. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elec-
tions of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965).
151. This would not stop a person from making a "gift" to someone
three months before an election with the "understanding" that the
money would be contributed to a certain candidate. Such a proposal,
however, might inhibit contributions of expense account money and
other like sources because few people are anxious to risk perjury. The
reluctant contributor might even use this requirement as an excuse to
limit his contribution.
152. This would also provide a check against reports filed by can-
didates and political committees. Its effectiveness may be questioned,
however, since it is not likely to catch "dirty" money, which is usually
in the form of cash.
153. See PRESIDENT'S CoMmIssIoN 17.
154. 43 Stat. 1073 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 248 (1964).
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printing, postage, posters, telephones, and the like, 55 these limi-
tations are only an invitation to hypocrisy. Evasion through
various means is the rule rather than the exception. Even in the
case which is most often cited as the epitome of the worst type
of campaigning, and which was marked by clear and continuous
evasions of the law, the candidate was not denied his seat in
Congress. 56 Few candidates are likely to have sufficient scru-
ples about such a rarely enforced provision to refrain from
digging into their pockets to cover a "necessary" last minute
expenditure.
Perhaps it could be argued that the limited scope of coverage
redeems this provision somewhat. Since this section does not
apply to campaigns for nomination,157 the time when a candi-
date is most likely to have to spend his own money, he is not
likely to have enough money left to exceed the statutory limita-
tion. In fact, he might even be able to use the limit as an excuse
when asking the party to cover necessary campaign expenses.
Of course, this argument is spurious and misses the thrust of the
section, which was intended to prevent rich men from buying
elective office. But so long as the statute does not cover pri-
maries, where the rich man has the greatest advantage,' 58 it will
only encourage hypocrisy. A candidate for Senator could, with-
out violating this provision, spend $1,000,000 for statewide pub-
licity in an uncontested campaign for his party's nomination,
and then spend only $25,000 in his campaign for election.
Another oddity of this provision is that, while it limits the
amounts of expenditures a candidate can make, it does not limit
the amount of contributions he can receive. All that is required
is a filed report listing all known contributions and expendi-
tures made by others on his behalf. 59 An interesting proposal
might be based upon this provision. In order to fulfill the pur-
pose of this section, which is to prevent rich men from buying an
155. See id.
156. Although the Senate was moved to investigate the 1950 Mary-
land senatorial campaign because of the vicious smear tactics which
pervaded it, its cursory examination of the campaign financing proved
that at least $27,000 in contributions was not reported. See generally
Hearings on S. Res. 250 Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and
Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
157. The definition of candidate, "an individual whose name is pre-
sented at an election for election as Senator or Representative . . .,
does not include a candidate for nomination or for the presidency or
vice presidency. 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241 (b) (1964).
158. See § I.D. supra.
159. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1964).
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election, °60 a candidate should be allowed, without adverse tax
consequences, 6" to give unexpended contributions to his party
to be used in his behalf in the next election. Although this
would strengthen party finances and there would not be much
chance for abuse, three facts mitigate against the success of such
a plan: most candidates have no money left over after an elec-
tion; independent candidates would receive no benefit; and this
proposal would probably run afoul of section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code, which disqualifies political organizations
from obtaining a nonprofit exemption. Nevertheless, in order to
strengthen the parties, such a proposal is worthy of considera-
tion.
If limitations are thought desirable, and it is not at all cer-
tain they are,' 62 they should include primaries and should be set
at a more realistic level. One proposal would have increased the
limit to either $50,000 or an amount obtained by multiplying twen-
ty cents by the total number of votes, not to exceed 1,000,000,
cast in the last general election for that office, and ten cents for
each vote in excess of 1,000,000; or the number of people regis-
tered to vote for the particular office could be substituted in
lieu of the number of votes cast in the last general election.
63
A better plan would be to eliminate separate limitations on can-
didates and political committees and to impose an aggregate lim.
itation on the campaign made by or on behalf of a candidate for
nomination or election ' 64 The greatest problem -with limita-
tions, however, is that they must be drawn large enough so
that a candidate is not forced, as a practical matter, to find ways
160. See McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 69 (1944) (Black,
J., dissenting).
161. A candidate's campaign expenditures are not tax deductible.
McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944). See § IV. A.1. infra
for discussion.
162. Even Senator Long (Mo.), sponsor of S. 604, 87th Cong" st
Sess.- (1961), stated he. would have no objection to having no ceilings.
1961 Hearings 173. President Johnson's reform proposal imposes: no
limitations, S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. -(1966), nor does the Iouse
Republican bill, H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
163. S. 2541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1966); This bill, whichwas
reported out favorably by the Senate Committee on Rules and Admin-
istration, S. RuP. No. 1457, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), is -exactly the
same bill that was introduced in 1961. S. 2426 § 208, H.R. 9255 § 208,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
164. The problems with aggregate ceilings lie in dealing with unau-
thorized expenditures and identifying expenditures as being made on
behalf of a candidate. Requiring committees to register might solve
some of the problems, but the problem of dealing with committees sup-




to evade them. But at the same time, if they are placed beyond
what a candidate can reasonably expect to spend, limitations are
of no use. For example, in the proposed change cited above,
twenty cents per vote is allowed, although national party cam-
paign costs, disregarding spending by labor and miscellaneous
committees, were about sixteen cents per vote for the number
of votes cast in the 1960 presidential election.165
D. LIMITATION ON POLITICAL CouMimrEEs
A political committee, as defined by the statute, is one which
operates in more than one state or is a branch of a national com-
mittee."6 Such a committee is prohibited from spending or
accepting more than $3,000,000 during any year 67 and must
file certain required reports, dealing with contributions to and
expenditures by and on behalf of the committee, with the Clerk
of the House of Representatives. 68
Putting aside problems of reporting for the moment, there
are two major deficiencies in the present statute: its linitation
on contributions and its coverage.
The $3,000,000 limitation was never effective. The parties
simply formed a plethora of committees, each of which accepted
up to $3,000,000 in contributions, thus flouting the original con-
gressional intent to make $3,000,000 an aggregate amount for
each national party.6" Most informed opinion suggests that the
limitation be done away with completely. 70 Its only effect has
165. ALEXANDER, FINANCING =H PARTIES AND CAiPAIGNS, THE PREsi-
DENTIAL ELECTION AND TRANSITION 1960-1961, 116 (1961).
166. 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1964). 18 U.S.C. § 591
(1964) is exactly the same.
167. 18 U.S.C. § 609 (1964).
168. 43 Stat. 1071 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 244 (1964). There is a latent
kroblem in this section. The treasurer is presumed to have knowledge
"of contributions and expenditures of the committee in the- usual course
of business. United States v. Burroughs, 65 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1933).,
alf'd, 290 U.S. 534 (1933). Butthe section'makes him responsible for ex-
penditures on behalf of the committee. Since this is a criminal statute,
probably the presumption of knowledge cannot apply, although the stat-
ute makes no textual distinction between knowledge and responsibility.,
169. See Overacker, Campaign Finance in the Presidential Election
of 1940, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 701, 705 (1941). See also Lederle, Pobit-
ical Committee Expenditures and the Hatch Act; 44 Mcm L. REv. 294,
296 (1945).
170. See Gore Report 21. This is just as true today as it was
twenty-five years ago. The Republicans specifically made repeal of the
$3,000,000 limitation part of their proposals for reform this year. The
Washington D.C., Sunday Star, Dec. 19, 1965, § A. p.18, col. 3. H.R.
16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). President Johnson's reform proposal
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been to encourage decentralized parties,171 and effective enforce-
ment of any limitation would not be worth the effort, even if
it could be enforced.
Effective enforcement of limitations presents almost insuper-
able problems. For example, what is to be done with commit-
tees which are not affiliated with any candidate, but support a
policy coincidentally supported by a candidate. 7 2 Forcing com-
mittees to get the candidate's authorization 173 is probably a vio-
lation of the first amendment right to free speech. 7 4 Even if
not, it would impede political participation by interested indi-
viduals-hardly a proper aim for election reform. Another prob-
lem with limitations is fixing their amount.
7 5
The best solution would, therefore, seem not to be limitations
on the amount of contributions political committees and candi-
dates could receive. Rather, it would be to publicize before the
election those contributions they do receive. 76
Too limited coverage is another serious loophole which
should be closed. The statute does not reach intrastate commit-
tees other than branches of a national committee.'1 Thus,
most committees supporting congressional candidates are subject
only to whatever state controls happen to be available,1 8 even
though candidates are supposed to file reports covering contri-
butions received by others in their behalf, with their knowledge
and consent. 79  This leaves a large gap in control. 80  Address-
ing itself to this problem the Gore Committee stated: "Senatorial
would also eliminate this unjustifiable limitation. S. 3435, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966).
171. See HEARD, THE CosTs OF DEmocPAcY 255 (Anchor ed. 1962).
172. Whether such a committee would be subject to the statute
would depend on whether its actions were "done for the purpose of in-
fluencing the election in that particular congressional district .... "
1961 Hearings 67. Such intent defies proof. Nor would the problem
be solved by a change in the definition of "political committee." See
Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1259, 1264 (1953).
173. E.g., S. 1623, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(h) (i) (1961), which
tried to avoid the constitutional question by permitting unauthorized
committees to spend up to $1,000. See also Newman, Money and Elec-
tions in Great Britain-Guide for America, 10 W. POL. Q. 582 (1957).
174. Cf. Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1259, 1267-68 (1953).
175. See notes 163 and 165 supra and accompanying text.
176. See § III. G. infra for a discussion of disclosure as a remedy.
177. 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1964); 18 U.S.C. §
591 (1964).
178. See ALExADER & DENNY, REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE 59
(1966).
179. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (Supp. 1965).
180. Gore Report 21.
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candidates are usually supported by statewide committees
which receive and expend funds on behalf of an entire ticket,
and allocations of funds to the particular candidates or their
committees are difficult to make and only infrequently appear in
the reports."' 8 ' Intrastate committees which support candi-
dates for nomination or election to Congress or the Presidency
should be required to report and, if a limitation upon receipt of
contributions is desirable, should be included within the limita-
tion. Arguments against control of intrastate committees, on
the ground that it would constitute interference with state con-
trol, sound rather hollow in view of all the federal election laws
which cover exclusively intrastate affairs8 2 and the broad
grounds upon which courts have upheld Congress' power over
federal elections. 8 3 To ease the administrative burden, how-
ever, coverage could be limited to committees which receive or
expend more than $2,500.184
E. LIITATION ON UNIONS
It is unlawful for . . . any labor organization to make a
contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at
which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator
or Representative in . . . Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or
caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices,
or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to
accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section. 185
This is different from the provisions which have been previously
examined. There is here a complete prohibition of expenditures
and contributions at all levels, not merely at the interstate or
final election level. The policies involved in such a provision are
also different. Congress has decided that contributions or ex-
penditures by unions "in connection with" the election of fed-
eral candidates are wrongful per se. They are therefore pro-
hibited. Part of the reason for passing the statute was clearly
the fear that unions would gain a disproportionate amount of
181. Id. at 7.
182. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 602 (solicitation from federal employees),
608 (individual limitation on contributions), 610 (prohibition of cor-
porate and union contributions), and 612 (publication or distribution
of anonymous political statements).
183. See § H. D. supra. President Johnson and House Republicans
recognized this and would require all political committees, interstate
and intrastate, to report. S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201(c), 204
(1966); H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(c) (1966).
184. E.g., S. 2436, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(3) (1960); S. 604, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(3) (1961).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. 1965).
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influence because of the massive amounts of money and man-
power available to them. The usual reason given, however, was
the need to protect the rights of the minority who were forced to
join unions, but who did not desire to contribute to the party
chosen by union leaders. 80
There are, however, grave doubts about the constitutional
validity of this section, particularly as applied to the prohibition
on expenditures, because of its impact "upon the freedom of
individuals organized into an association to carry on political
activities directly related to the welfare of the members of the
group.' u8 T
The Supreme Court has persistently refused to face the
crucial issue of the section's constitutionality. In the first case
to reach the Court, 8 the C0 had opposed a candidate in a
newspaper which it had distributed in his election district during
the campaign. The majority held that since the newspaper
was primarily for internal consumption, it was not within the
prohibitions. 8 9 The real reason for the majority opinion, how-
ever, seems to have been the knowledge that the decision,
which would be very controversial, would be handed down on
the eve of a presidential election campaign. 190 The four dissent-
ing Justices concluded that such publications were clearly with-
in the congressional intent, 191 but -that such a prohibition was
unconstitutional because it was not needed to protect the rights
of minority members of the union.192 The next case to reach the
Supreme Court' 98 was again decided on the internal-external
distribution test, although the constitutional issue was again
presented. 94 This case held that use of union dues to sponsor
186. Kallenbach, The Taft-Hartley Act and Union Political Contri-
butions and Expenditures, 33 M.bN. L. Rv. 1 (1948).
187. Id. at 20.
188. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1947).
189. Id. at 123. See Kallenbach, supra note 186, at 17 for biting
criticism of the decision.
190. Kallenbach, supra note 186, at 17.
191. 335 U.S. at 129-30. Senator Taft believed the prohibition
would apply to periodicals supported by union dues, 93 CONG. REc. 6436,
6437, 6440 (1947), but would not prevent endorsements in union publica-
tions supported by voluntary subscriptions. 93 CoNG. REc. 6437 (1947).
192. 335 U.S. at 149.
193. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1956).
194. The Government's brief presented the issue as follows:
"[Whether] the actual restraint upon union political activity imposed
by the statute is so narrowly limited that Congress did not exceed its
powers to protect the political process from undue influence of large
aggregations of capital and to promote individual responsibility for demo-
cratic government." 352 U.S. 567, 590 (1956).
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television broadcasts to influence a congressional election was
unlawful. 9 5 The three dissenters argued that the section was an
unconstitutional abridgement of a union's right to "express
its views on the issues of an election and on the merits of the
candidates, unrestrained and unfettered by the Congress."' 96
Finally, in 1960 a suit was brought by some members of a
union to enjoin the union from expending money to dissemi-
nate information and the union's views about certain candi-
dates.19'7 Although violation of the section was not argued, 198
the four man opinion implied that the section would have been
found unconstitutional. 19 9  While recognizing the right of the
minority to the return of its money or to enjoin spending of its
money on political causes with which it disagreed, the decision
forbade the minority from obtaining a total injunction against
any political expenditures, for fear of unduly impeding unions'
freedom of action.200 Mr. Justice Douglas concurred to make a
majority, although he felt that subordinating an individual's
right to speak to the majority's views violated his first amend-
ment freedom. 20' The minority correctly pointed out that the
effect of the majority's decision was to leave the union's minor-
ity without effective protection against the majority, since the
cost of obtaining relief through the avenues left open by the
majority of the Court is prohibitive. Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, the minority has no way of preventing union leaders from
spending union money as they see fit.20 2
195. 352 U.S. at 585. A later case, however, held that such action
was not a violation if done in the regular course of union activity and
if supported by voluntary contributions. United States v. Anchorage
Cent. Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alaska 1961).
196. 352 U.S. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas
went on further to say that:
It usually costs money to communicate an idea to a large audi-
ence .... Nor can the fact that it costs money to make a
speech .. make the speech any less an exercise of First Amend-
ment rights. Yet this statute, as construed and applied in this
indictment, makes criminal any "expenditure" by a union for
the purpose of expressing its views on the issues of an election
and the candidates.
Id. at 594.
197. 1AM v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
198. Id. at 773.
199. See id. at 775.
200. Id. at 774.
201. Id. at 778.
202. Aside from the constitutional question, if the Court had allowed
members to seek injunctions against political expenditures by their
unions, they would be forced to rely upon voluntary contributions for
political expenditures. See, e.g., United States v. Anchorage Cent. Labor
Council, 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alaska 1961), which approved television
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Moreover, it is almost impossible to draw a line between
political and "educational" expenditures. Union leadership
should be permitted much more latitude in educational expendi-
tures, since their very purpose would be defeated by allowing a
minority to stop such activity, merely because of disagreement
with leadership's positions. Perhaps the rule of thumb used by
courts to distinguish between educational and political expendi-
tures is the best that can be devised. If a publication is pri-
marily internal, it is educational and therefore permissible; 20 3
if a publication is primarily aimed at nonmembers, it is political
and therefore impermissible.20 4
The question, however, whether unions should be permitted,
consonant with minority rights, to express their interests
through political expenditures is still open. Arguments in favor
of this position are that unions are multipurpose organizations
including, among other objectives, protection of their members
through legislation,20 5 and that allowing unions to express their
views will help to clarify the voters' choice.206 The opposing
argument is that, since each citizen has a vote, it would be un-
fair discrimination against those citizens who do not belong to a
union to allow a union more influence than the sum total of
its members' votes. This argument lacks persuasiveness because,
as a practical matter, the only way most individuals can exert
influence upon society is through group action. Whatever
should be the policy regarding external political expenditures,
there seems to be little reason to prevent a union from pre-
senting information to its own members. 20 7
In any case, it is true that unions do exert great political in-
fluence, which is not likely to diminish greatly in the future,
if only because of their sizeable membership. In addition, unions
have a wide range of permissible activities, which can have a
great effect on the outcome of elections: they can carry en-
dorsements in their own newspapers, 208 take paid advertising in
broadcasting by the union in the regular course of business so long as it
was supported by voluntary contributions. This would seem to be in line
with congressional intent. See note 191 supra.
203. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
204. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
205. See, e.g., Hearings on H. Res. 558 Before Special Committee to
Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1952);
Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of
Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 992 n.88; Kallenbach, supra
note 186, at 24.
206. See Bicks & Friedman, supra note 205, at 997.
207. See Kallenbach, supra note 186, at 24.
208. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
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outside newspapers, 20 9 systematically conduct voter registration
drives210 and "educational" campaigns, 21 ' and even continue to
pay salaries of union employees while at work for a candidate.
212
It would seem, therefore, that the question is not whether
unions should be able to exert influence through political expen-
ditures, but whether the law protects rights of union minorities.
The answer must be that present law does not adequately pro-
tect those rights. Congress should continue the present ban on
direct union contributions, but should recognize that unions are
a legitimate conduit for members to make voluntary political
contributions. Such contributions should be permitted with
proper safeguards to ensure that contributions are indeed volun-
tary. Congress should also, despite problems of definition, en-
courage unions to make bipartisan expenditures.
2 13
F. LMITATION ON CoRPORATIONs
Corporate political activity is prohibited in three different
sections, which tend to overlap but vary in coverage. Section
610214 is the basic provision and is typical of the lack of thought
that went into drafting election controls. After prohibiting na-
tional banks and corporations organized by Congress from con-
tributing or expending money in certain elections and activities,
the section goes on alternatively to prohibit "any corporation
whatever" from contributing or expending money in a much
wider range of activities.215 The second provision prohibits direct
209. United States v. Painters Union, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
210. Gore Report 24; 1961 Hearings 178-79. See note 212 infra.
211. These are the primary means used to avoid prohibition against
expenditures "in connection with" elections. Gore Report 25-26 (Curtis,
dissenting). These are, however, suposedly financed primarily by vol-
untary contributions. 1956 Hearings 309. One rather extreme case of
"educational" expenditures of this sort was upheld in United States v.
Anchorage Cent. Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alaska 1961).
212. United States v. Construction Union, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D.
Mo. 1951). This case seems clearly erroneous because no theoretical
distinction can be drawn between furnishing cash directly to a candidate
or indirectly by paying his workers. Nor did the court consider whether
this action was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1964) (prohibition of
contributions or expenditures by one negotiating or performing a federal
contract).
213. PprsmENT's CommissIoN 12.
214. See text accompanying note 229 supra, substituting the word
"corporation" for "labor organization." For historical perspective, see
Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.
U.L. REV. 1033 (1965).
215. The section was held constitutional in United States v. Brewers'
Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
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or indirect political contributions by anyone contracting with the
federal government, either during negotiation or performance of
the contract.216 The coverage of this section is not clear because
the usual definitions are not applicable.217 Perhaps the prohibi-
tions will be judicially extended to the state level,21 8 as is the
third provision,219 which is the Part of the Public Utilities Hold-
ing Company Act. It shows what can be done when Congress is
serious about prohibiting political contributions. That provision
prohibits by clear, all inclusive language any political contribu-
tion on the state or federal level "in connection with the candida-
cy, nomination, election or appointment ... to any office or posi-
tion in the Government .... ",220
216. 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1964).
217. The definitional section, 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1964), applies only to
§§ 597, 599, 602, 609, and 610. Also, since § 611 is not confined to nomina-
tions or elections, it should be held to apply to all forms of political
activities between elections. Although the legislative history indicates
that § 611 was not intended to apply to corporations, it seems that this
was based on the misapprehension that § 610 covered all corporations.
See 86 CONG. REC. 2982 (1940); Lambert, supra note 214, at 1059 n.103.
218. A possible rationale for this result can be based on the fact
that this section is derived from the power over appropriations. See 86
CONG. REc. 2338 (1940). See generally H.R. REP. No. 2376, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940).
219. It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company,
or any subsidiary company thereof, by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise,
directly or indirectly-(1) to make any contribution whatsoever in connection
with the candidacy, nomination, election or appointment of
any person for or to any office or position in the Government
of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision of a
State, or any agency, authority, or instrumentality of any one
or more of the foregoing; or(2) to make any contribution to or in support of any politi-
cal party or any committee or agency thereof.
The term "contribution" as used in this subsection includes any
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or any-
thing of value, and includes any contract, agreement, or promise
whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution.
49 Stat. 824-25 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(1) (h) (1964).
220. This provision was held to be constitutional in Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943) because contribu-
tions would be reflected in utility rates and are thus within Congress'
power to control interstate commerce. None of these provisions, how-
ever, has ever been tested as a violation of a corporation's right to free
speech. For discussion of the relationship between corporations and the
first amendment, see Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ.
of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 244 (1936).
"Corporations have been held within the first amendment's protec-
tion against restrictions upon the circulation of their media of expres-
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It is probable that Congress intended to make no distinc-
tion between prohibition of union and corporate contributions, 21
thus the same arguments can be advanced against both: such
contributions are outside the legitimate goals of these organiza-
tions, force minorities to support candidates they may oppose,
discriminate against nonmembers or nonshareholders, and enable
contributing organizations to exert undue influence upon elec-
tions. Only the last is a serious justification for the prohibition
against corporations. Corporations are established to make mon-
ey, and in order to operate at a profit within a framework of
complex regulations, they must have governmental neutrality,
if not its cooperation. Thus, a cogent argument can be advanced
that insuring this neutrality through contributions is a legitimate
goal for a profit making organization. Nor are corporate contri-
butions likely to seriously impinge upon the rights of share-
holders, since shareholders are much more fluid as a group than
are union members. The real problem is that corporations con-
trol such large amounts of money that, if uncontrolled, they could
literally buy elections to the United States Senate, as they were
able to do in the late nineteenth century.
Prohibitions against direct corporate contributions are
clearly justified -2 22 and should be continued; however, the most
sion." United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 154-55 (1948) (concurring
opinion). See also King, Corporate Political Spending and The First
Amendment, 23 U. PITT. L. REV. 847, 854-61 (1962); 27 FoRDAmU L. REv.
599, 604-6 (1959); 31 Rocv MvT. L. REV. 370, 378-9 (1959). Lambert
even goes so far as to state that these provisions all violate a corpora-
tion's right to free speech. See Lambert, supra note 214, at 1065-66. On
the other hand, it has been argued that corporations are not within the
first amendment. Ruah, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34
So. CAL. L. REv. 152, 162 n.49 (1961). See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 514 (1939); Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-50 (1928).
There has even been a suggestion that these provisions are uncon-
stitutionally vague and therefore void. Lambert, supra note 214, at 1063-
64. This argument, however, seems weak at best.
221. PREsmENV's CormwIssIoN 20. See also United States v. CIO,
335 U.S. 106, 154-55 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
222. However, it has been argued that since even partisan advertis-
ibig is informative, it should be encouraged. Comment, 69 YALE L.J.
1017, 1051-52 (1960). Lambert would go one step further to allow cor-
porations and unions to deduct as much of the cost of partisan adver-
tising as was an ordinary and necessary business expense if the adver-
tising stated who paid for it. Lambert, supra note 214, at 1076. How-
ever, this would not seem wise. Although advertising is a visible ex-
penditure and therefore more easily controllable, it is almost impossible
to envisage a situation in which, within the democratic context, partisan




that can be accomplished is limitation, not elimination of cor-
porate influence. Although large contributions by corporate di-
rectors are an important source of political funds, 223 directors, as
individuals, cannot be forbidden to contribute because this would
violate their first amendment rights. Corporations make use of
many techniques, such as padded expense accounts, free use of
corporate property by candidates, etc., which are difficult to
detect and almost impossible to control.224 Some of these abuses
may be controlled because they can no longer be deducted from
gross income,225 and the Internal Revenue Service is not known
for its inclination to allow deductions..2 6  Other techniques, in
view of permissible union activities and congressional intent to
treat unions and corporations alike,227 would seem to be per-
missible means of exercising corporate influence. For example,
the Gore Committee found that
corporations have been advised in broadly disseminated publi-
cations of the United States Chamber of Commerce and legal
opinions that they may engage in the following political activi-
ties:
(1) pay salaries and wages of officers and regular employees
which engage in political activities;228
(2) publish opinions and arguments of a political nature, ex-
223. See Gore Report 13; ALEXANDER, FnANCiNG THE 1964 ELECTION
91 (1966).
224. See id. at 24. See also Norton-Taylor, How to Give Money to
Politicians, Fortune, May 1956, p. 113, 238.
225. Pub. L. No. 368, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. III. § 301 (March 15,
1966) (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 276). However, even prior to passage of
this section partisan campaign contributions were not deductible. Sev-
eral rationales were suggested. One found such contributions not to be
sufficiently related to business survival to be ordinary and necessary
expenses within the meaning of INT. Rmv. CODE OF 1954, § 162. This ra-
tionale, however, was not always followed. See Rev. Rul. 156, 1962-2
CuM. BuLL 47, allowing deductions for bipartisan support; Lambert,
supra note 214, at 1069-76. Another rationale was that to allow corpora-
tions to deduct campaign contributions would be to disrupt the tax
equilibrium between corporations and individuals. See 69 YALE L.J.
1017 (1960). The real reason for disallowing such deductions, however,
was that allowance would have been violative of clear statutory policy
embodied in the provisions prohibiting campaign contributions by cor-
porations. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 508 (1959).
226. However, the Internal Revenue Service views its position as
a tax collector, not as a policeman. See Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Privileges and Elections of fhe Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration, 82d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 516-529 (1952) (investiga-
tion into 1950 Ohio senatorial campaign).
227. See note 221 supra and accompanying text.
228. Since this has been held to be permissible union activity, United
States v. Construction Union, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951), by




pressed as views of the corporation, in any house organ or other
printed document circulated at the expense of the corporation;22 9
(3) purchase radio and television time or newspaper space for
the presentation of the corporation's political views;23
0
(4) use any other means of expressing the political views of
the corporate management, publicly or privately;
(5) encourage people to register and vote, and disseminate in-
formation and opinions concerning public issues without regard
to parties and candidates.23
1
Even traditionally conservative bankers have commonly vio-
lated the statute. Despite prohibition of contributions by na-
tional banks232 and the definition of contribution which specifi-
cally includes loans,233 it seems that such loans are commonly
made.234 Some bankers seem to have the mistaken belief that
such loans are permissible if made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, 235 but there is nothing in the statute to support this view.
A more important problem arises when an individual negotiates
a personal loan and turns the proceeds over to a political com-
mittee which pays back the interest and principal. The bank
should not be considered to violate the statute only in the unu-
sual situation where the bank has no knowledge of the loan's pur-
pose and the formal borrower also remains personally obligated
on the loan. The loan would then be to the individual who, in
view of the definition of a contribution,2 6 would be deemed to
have made a contribution of the face amount of the loan.
G. DISCLOSURE
Effective publicity is required if effective control of cam-
paign contributions is to be achieved, but the present publicity
provisions are totally inadequate. Reports are presently required
from political committees,' 37 candidates,23s and individuals who
independently expend more than fifty dollars to influence elec-
tions in two or more states.2 30  However, except for a require-
229. Cf. United States v. Lewis Food Co., 236 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.
Cal. 1964) upheld this as a proper corporate activity.
230. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
231. Gore Report 24.
232. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1964).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1964). "The term 'contribution' includes a
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of
value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not
legally enforceable to make a contribution." 2 U.S.C. § 241(d) (1964).
234. See Gore Report 64-65 for an illustrative list of loans.
235. Id. at 16.
236. See note 233 supra.
237. 43 Stat. 1071 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 244 (1964).
238. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1964).
239. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 245 (1964).
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ment that each of these reports be verified under oath by the
person submitting them,240 the requirements are not uniform,
241
and the coverage omits most important sources of congressional
campaign contributions.
Lack of coverage is the most glaring defect in the present
statutes. Since the definition of a political committee does not
include intrastate committees, 242 most contributions to congres-
sional elections, except as required by state law, go unre-
ported.243  Nor do reports by candidates close this gap, be-
cause they need only report those contributions received by them
or by a person with their knowledge or consent 2 44 and candidates
have interpreted that requirement as excluding contributions to
intrastate committees. An even more glaring loophole is that
candidates are not required to report contributions received dur-
ing primaries, 245 when they are most in danger of being "bought."
Although the Supreme Court has upheld present publicity
provisions,2 46 it has not yet faced the question whether these pro-
visions violate first amendment rights of contributors by forcing
them to expose their political beliefs. The question is whether
the inhibitory effects of publicity upon expression of opinion by
persons who would prefer to remain anonymous, 247 is outweighed
by the dangers of unpublicized contributions, which can pervert
democratic processes by depriving the- electorate of a chance to
elect a person to represent their interests.248 The answer would
.240. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 247 (1964).
241. E.g., candidates must report only the names of all their contribu-
tors, 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1964), but political committees
must report names and addresses of contributors of over $100, 43 Stat.
1071 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 244 (1964). In view of the size of the reports,
the cutoff point for political committees seems to be necessary, but there
seems to be-no justification for requiring candidates to report all contri-
butions but not tha addresses of the contributors.
..242. 43 Stat. 1070 (1925),.2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1964). -
243. See Gore Report 8.
244. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1964).
245: 60 Stat. 1352 (1946); 2 U.S.C. § 241(a) (Supp. 1965). How-
ever, since 2 U.S.C. § 246(a) (1) requires a candidate to report all con-
tributions known to him that are made "in aid or support of his candidacy
for election or for the- purpose of influencing the result of the election,"
it could be -argued that candidates for election should include contribu-
tions made during primary campaigns. Unfortunately, this is not the
interpretation given to this section by candidates, and it would not be
applicable:to losers of primaries because they would not be "candidates."
See 2 U.S.C. 241(b) (1964).
246. Burroughs v. Cannon, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
247. Cf. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Rumely v. United
States, 197 F.2d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1952), affd, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
248. Cf. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); Smith v. ICC, 245
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seem to be clear: the potential inhibition from contributing to a
political party, compared with the potentiality of large sums of
unreported contributions, weighs heavily in favor of finding such
a provision constitutional. As a practical matter, the person most
likely to be detered by publicity from contributing-the "little
man" who cannot afford to offend his superiors-is least likely
to have his contribution publicized. It is hard to conceive of
someone going up to the repository of reports to see whether
an underling contributed to the "proper" political party, and
newspapers are unlikely to list small or medium contributions.
While disclosure does have certain disadvantages, it does of-
fer two types of advantages:
informative and group-pressure effects can be achieved with-
out legislative determination of the bounds of permissible con-
duct; the enforcement effect, on the other hand, may simplify
the administration of substantive standards and perhaps make
possible the substitution of private for public enforcement. 249
In effect, disclosure and an effective publicity system leave the
final judgment about candidates and contributions in the hands
of the voters, where it belongs.250 Indeed, mere existence of a
disclosure procedure might tend to inhibit contributors' expecta-
tions and legislators' willingness to accommodate them. 251 How-
ever, disclosure is least likely to reach those contributions which
should be prohibited. Although a disclosure statute may offer
a means of punishing those underworld contributors whose un-
reported cash contributions do not reach the level of bribery, the
principal purpose of disclosure is to identify sources and ex-
penditures, not to regulate them.252
Disclosure, to be effective, must be combined with wide
ranging publicity, preferably by the mass media. This requires
reports to be uniform, intelligible, and filed in enough time to
allow publicity about their contents to reach the electorate be-
fore they go to the polls. 2 53 While none of these elements is now
present in federal laws,254 the Florida experience shows that if
the information is available in usable form,255 it will be given
U.S. 33 (1917); Nutting, Freedom of Speech: Constitutional Protection
Against Governmental Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 MICH. L. REV.
181, 202 (1948).
249. Note, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1273, 1292 (1963).
250. See 1956 Hearings 1283.
251. Cf. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 97-100 (1952).
252. ALEXANDER, MONEY, POLITICS AND PUBLIC REPORTING 7 (1960).
253. See Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incentive for
Small Contributors, 18 LA. L. REV. 414, 418 (1958).
254. See Gore Report 3.




It is clear that if effective disclosure and publicity of cam-
paign contributions are to be possible, extensive changes must be
made in present statutes. The first thing which must be done is
to enlarge coverage to include "all political committees inter and
intra state, state and local, party and non-party, subsidiary and
independent, campaigning directly or indirectly for candidates
for nomination or election as President or Vice President [and
other federal offices] raising or spending as much as $2,500 in
a year. ' ' 257 It might even be suggested that individuals who
contributed an aggregate of $100 or more in a year to political
committees or candidates should be required to report,25 8 as a
check upon the accuracy of other reports. This would not be a
radical change from the present statute, under which individ-
uals who contribute more than fifty dollars in elections in two
or more states have to report.
259
There should be one standard reporting form, so that infor-
mation is easily accessible and comparable with reports of other
candidates.260  The information required should be fairly de-
tailed, so that it will record significant contributions and gifts,
a contribution or expenditure on behalf of a candidate for state office
except through a duly appointed treasurer. The Florida Supreme Court
in a four to two decision upheld this section as constitutional. Smith v.
Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1953). But grave doubts exist as to whether
the same result would be reached by the United States Supreme Court.
It could be cogently argued that this violates the first amendment right
to free speech. Cf. State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615, 158 N.W. 696 (1916)
(similar statute held to violate the state bill of rights). But the Court
might not be persuaded because of the unlikelihood of a candidate's re-
fusing a contribution, and the danger of undisclosed contributions.
256. See Roady, Ten Years of Florida's "Who Gave It-Who Got It"
Law, 27 LAw & CoN=mVP. PROB. 434 (1962); Hearings, House Special
Committee to Investigate Campaign Expznditures, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 175
('1952).
257. PaiSmEsNT's ComAIssIoN 18. President Johnson's proposal
would go even further by requiring all committees supporting can-
didates to report. S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201(c), 204 (1966);
as would the House Republican bill. H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 201(c) (1966). This might be a better.solution since it would probably
pay a candidate to establish numerous committees to evade the limitation.
258. S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 205 (1966). Other proposals
would have raised the limit to $500. E.g., S. 2541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 203 (1966).
259. 43 Stat. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 245 (1964).
260. Cf. S. 2541, § 203, S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 206(a) (1966)
(President Johnson's Bill); S. 2426, § 204(a), H.R. 9255, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(a) (1961), which place a duty on the Clerk of the House and
the Secretary of the Senate to prescribe and provide forms. The Repub-
licans, on the other hand, would give this duty to an independent agency.
H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 207(1) (1966).
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but not so detailed that all contributions and gifts get lost in a
mass of insignificant detail.26 ' Ideally, the reports should dis-
close candidates' total financial status so that questionable gifts
and "investments" would be disclosed. 26 2 These reports should
be open to the public within twenty-four hours of receipt,26 3 and
the public should also be free to copy them. 264 As it stands now,
even a senatorial committee cannot copy reports in the Office of
the Clerk of the House without permission of the Speaker of the
House. 20 5 Also, the number of reports should be increased to
a maximum of eight per year in order to assure effective public-
ity.266  Political committees should have to file four quarterly
reports in April, July, October, and December, one ten days be-
fore a primary or election, and a final one thirty days after the
primary or election. These reports would break down informa-
tion enough to be digested and publicized, would include annual
fund raising dinners usually held between February and June,
and would give a report within one month of elections.
261. See ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 252, at 48-51; H.R. 16203,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
262. The Dodd affair indicates the need for such a plan but passage
of such a proposal is highly unlikely. This may be the reason that
the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration ignored President
Johnson's bill which would require reporting of all compensation and
gifts, except from one's immediate family. S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
§§ 304(c), (d) (1966); see S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 301-03 (1966);
H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 301-03 (1966).
The Republicans, however, have pursued such a plan fairly vigor-
ously. The House Republican Policy Committee bill would require can-
didates to reveal, prior to election, a detailed statement of all income
received during the immediately preceeding twelve months and, if
elected, a yearly statement thereafter. This yearly statement would
also disclose all gifts received by their immediate families except those
from other family members. The bill wisely goes one step further by
requiring similar reports from policy level employees of the executive
department, defined as those in the top five pay grades, even though
acceptance of gifts of more than nominal value is prohibited by Exec.
Order No. 11222 of May 8, 1965. H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§
301-06 (1966).
263. See, e.g., S. 1623, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 216, 217 (1961); S.
2436, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 206(3), 207(4) (1960).
264. See S. 2541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 206(4) (1966); S. 3435, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 304(c), (d) (1966); H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 207(4) (1966). S. 2426, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 206(4), 207(5), H.R.
9255, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 206(4), 207(5) (1961) specified that copies
were to be provided at cost.
265. Gore Report 8.
266. But see S. 2436, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(a) (1960) which
would have cut down the required number of reports from four to two
in non-election years. S. 2426, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a), H.R. 9255,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (1961) also adopted this idea.
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It is generally agreed that these reports should be placed in
a central repository. The problem is where. The executive
branch may be quickly dismissed because Congress would never
permit it. Probably the same fate would befall a nonpartisan or
bipartisan independent agency such as suggested by the Presi-
dent's Commission on Campaign Costs. 2 7 The Comptroller Gen-
eral would be ideal, since the office is already equipped to handle
such reports, 268 but the Comptroller would not want the job be-
cause it would place him in the anomalous position of having to
report on his own employer. The final and most original sug-
gestion is to establish a Registry of Election Finance in the Office
of the Library of Congress, not to analyze and interpret the re-
ports, 26 9 but to assure availability of accurate and uniform facts,
leaving analysis and interpretation to others. The Registry
would also have the positive duty to see that all reports are filed,
that they are accurate and complete, and that matters calling for
action are referred to the Attorney General or to a congres-
sional committee.270  These reports should also be filed in the
states, either in the clerk's office of the federal district courts
2 71
or in the offices of state secretaries of state,272 in order to insure
267. See PaRsmSENT's CovmnssioN 19-20. This proposal was adopted
in S. 2080, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1961), but it, like all reform bills,
failed to pass. This ambitious plan might work if limited only to tabu-
lation of presidential candidates' reports, but it seems wasteful to sep-
arate the repository of congressional and presidential candidates' reports.
Besides, it is almost impossible to imagine a truly bipartisan agency in
such a sensitive field as campaign contributions. However, the Repub-
licans have adopted the suggestion of the President's Commission and,
despite the fact there is a Democratic President, would create an admin-
istrative agency called the Federal Elections Commission. H.R. 16203,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1966). See H.R. 18162, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.(1966).
268. Cf. S. 1623, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 214 (1961).
269. Analysis and interpretation by any such "impartial" govern-
mental agency would call for too many '"political" decisions. One of
the hardest would arise when an individual or group, not publicly as-
sociated with a candidate, made expenditures to advance a candidacy
without the consent of the candidate. Whether such a candidate should
be credited with those expenditures could have grave political conse-
quences. He might thereby violate the statutory ceiling, or even worse,
he might be identified with a fringe group in the minds of the electorate.
270. See ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 252, at 63-65, for suggested
list of duties. See H.R. 16203 & H.R. 18162, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
271. See, e.g., S. 2541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(a) (1966); S. 2436,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 205 (1960).
272. See, e.g., S. 1623, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 214, S. 2426, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 203, H.R. 9255, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1961). Although
at first it was thought that reports should be filed with clerks of federal
district courts, it was thought to be easier to give the function of re-
ceiving reports to the secretaries of state of the various states. Hearings
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easy accessibility to interested parties.
Whether compulsory publication of these reports should
be required is doubtful. The cost and time required to prepare a
summary voter pamphlet would be prohibitory and probably
would not provide the necessary focus or analysis to make the
reports intelligible to the electorate. It is probably sufficient to
make the information available to the press in an intelligible
form and to rely upon them to analyze the reports for the elec-
torate.
Several other suggestions have been made to insure accuracy
of reports: contributors should be required to contribute under
their true names, and knowing receipt of contributions made un-
der a false name should be punished;27 3 a central depository
should be established for all funds274 to simplify control and the
parties' bookkeeping; and the number of committees could be
controlled by either requiring them to have the approval of the
candidate they are supporting27 or requiring them to register.
Although politicians are split as to whether committees should
be required to get a candidate's approval,276 such a provision
would probably prove to be unworkable and might even consti-
tute a violation of the first amendment, because it would con-
dition an individual's right to speech upon prior approval of an-.
other person.277 Registration of committees which reasonably
expect to raise or spend more than $1,000 per year would avoid
this constitutional question and would provide the public at an
early date with knowledge of existing committees and whom they
Were supporting. In addition, this arrangement might serve to
strengthen the party system by reducing the number of com-
mittees.
Before the Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on House Ad-
ministration, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Surprisingly enough, President
Johnson's proposal made no such provision. S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966).
273. See MASS. GEnx. LAws ANN. ch. 55, §§ 8, 16 (1964); N.Y. ELEC-
TION LAW § 326.
274. FLA. STAT. AN. § 99.161 (1965) (see note 255 supra); MAss.
GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 55, § 17 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:41-2 (1964)
(campaign manager must deposit), 19:44-5 (depository must report
within 20 days after election).
275. See, e.g., S. 1623, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102(3), 209 (1961).
276. 1956 Hearings 1291-1307.
277. However, it could be argued that a candidate's approval is a
foregone conclusion, except for those groups whose support he does not
want, and who should not be able to solicit money on his behalf or
even "smear" his name by identification with them. It would also pre-
vent his opponent from making use of committees allegedly supporting
him but which are only used to impede his campaign.
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Although there is general agreement that reporting reforms
are needed,278 and most of the reform bills would have extended
coverage to include primaries, 279 the House has "lost" all of
them.28 0  In view of the apparent lack of enthusiasm for re-
form, it seems that only great public pressure, sparked by a bla-
tant abuse like the publication "Toward an Age of Greatness,"
will move Congress to action.
H. ENFORCEMMT
Enforcement of federal laws regulating campaign financing
has been practically nonexistent. Poor draftsmanship, lack of
enforcement provisions within existing law, and political con-
servatism have combined to make enforcement an empty
threat.2
8l
There is no public official charged with the responsibility
of compelling submission of reports required by law, examining
them, and reporting apparent violations to the Department of
Justice. The present repositories, the Clerk of the House and the
Secretary of the Senate, are merely custodians. Their only
responsibility is to receive reports, preserve them for two years,
and make them available for public inspection. 28 2  But if re-
ports are apparently missing, they will send out a letter to the
candidate as a reminder.2 8 3 This "lack of provision for regular
audit breeds irresponsibility in campaign bookkeeping and a cor-
responding lack of confidence in the accuracy and complete-
ness of reports. '28 4 Perhaps it is here that a central campaign
278. E.g., 1961 Hearings 181 (Senator Proxmire), 196 (Bailey,
Chairman Democratic National Committee).
279. E.g., S. 1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a), S. 1623, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 102(1) (1961); S. 2436, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(a) (1960).
280. Even the Senate, which usually passes reform bills, turned
down by a vote of forty-four to thirty an amendment specifically cov-
ering primary elections, 107 CONG. REc. 19663-64 (1961), despite the fact
that such a provision was passed the year before by a vote of fifty to
thirty-nine, and forty-seven of the same Senators were still in the Sen-
ate. 107 CONG. REc. 19661 (1961). By a vote of forty-three to thirty
the same fate befell an amendment -to include intrastate committees
spending more than $2,500. 107 CONG. REC. 19661 (1961). One of the
alleged reasons for these actions was the totally unconvincing one of
fear of intruding into state government. 107 CONG. REc. 19660 (1961).
But see H.R. 18162, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
281. See generally Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on
Privileges and Elections of the Committee on Rules and Administration,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1955).
282. 43 Stat. 1073 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 247 (1964).
283. ALExAmm, op. cit. supra note 252, at 28.
284. Id. at 10.
[Vol. 51:1
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
depository can provide the most benefit because, although it
might not discover transactions, it does simplify auditing pro-
cedures and increase the probability that any avoidance of the
law has been deliberate. It is much easier to show an intent to
avoid recording contributions when there is an official central
depository than when records are, as now, kept in a haphazard
fashion.
Even if there were some agency to audit candidates' reports,
the law would still have to be changed to make it enforceable.
As it stands now, the Attorney General does not want to en-
force the reporting provisions because they "are in some in-
stances at best very inadequate."28 5 Congress, however, has on
occasion refused to seat a member who spent more than was
"proper." But since a "proper amount" has not always been
gauged by the statutory ceilings, this sanction has been sporadic
and partisan in application..
2 8 6
Some have suggested allowing citizens to enforce the law
through court action,28 7 but such actions require a certain polit-
ical atmosphere before they will be brought,28 8 and even then
there is some doubt as to their utility.
28 9
Thus, sanctions must be available to require disclosure and
to control certain activities; however, disclosure seems to be the
best means of enforcing political morality and curbing "undue
influence." This also leaves the definition of "undue influence"
where it belongs-in the electorate. Requiring disclosure has
another benefit: because "dirty" money is not likely to be re-
ported for fear of public reaction, prosecution of such contribut-
ors and recipients will be simplified. The prosecutor need not
undertake the almost impossible task of proving intent to "cor-
rupt," he need only show that such a contribution was not re-
ported or was reported under a false name.
285. 1961 Hearings 198.
286. Cf. Barnett, Contested Congressional Elections inl Recent Years,
54 PoT.. ScL Q. 187 (1939).
287. See, e.g., MAss. GFN. LAws AiNN. ch. 55, § 28 (1953). Five
voters can bring a petition to invalidate an election, but the provision
is not applicable to candidates for Congress or the state legislature. Sec-
tion 30 permits one voter to request an election inquest, but this is
subject to judicial discretion.
288. It is a circle: without the requisite atmosphere no one will
bring suit, but suits are necessary to create that atmosphere.
289. Courts are very reluctant to allow such suits and, where they
are a matter of judicial discretion, they are usually denied. Irwin v.
Justice Brighton Mun. Ct., 298 Mass. 158, 10 N.E.2d 92 (1937). Part
of the reason seems to be a fear of undue harrassment. This might





1. Present Tax. Treatment
Although contributions were not per se deductible, deduc-
tions were formerly obtained by contributors by claiming the
cost of testimonial dinner tickets or political advertisements as
af 6±dinary business expense. This is no longer possible. As a
result of public furor over the Democratic fund raising ad book
ehtitled "Toward anAge of Greatness," Congress passed a statute
specifically denying deductions for the cost of dinner tickets or
advertisements if a candidate or political party is the direct 0f
indirect beneficiary of such activities.290 The Supreme Court
has decided, in a five to four decision, that candidates do not
coie within the general rule that only net income is taxed; there-
fore they cannot deduct the costs of running for election.2- '
Drawing heavily upon the structure of the Internal Revenue
Code, the Court has denied a deduction for unreimbursed cam-
paign expenses as an ordinary business expense 292 or as a loss
incurred in a transaction entered into for profit. Although a
strict reading of the Internal Revenue Code may support such a
decision,2 93 it- was a particularly unfortunate result. Mr. Justice
Black's dissent would, seem, to be much more justifiable in the
context of democratic theory: "Unless our democratic philos-
ophy- is wrong, there can be no .evil in a candidate spending a
legally permissible and necessary sum to approach the electorate
and enable them to pass an informed judgment upon his quali-
fications, ' '29
4
might negate the usefulness of the remedy because few candidates are
willing to 'cast 'the first stone.
290. Pub. L. No. 368, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. III (March 15, 1966),
Nw!...RFv...o-_oF 1954,§- 276, ..... .
291. McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
,:29.2.--Id: at 60. - INT.- REV. CODS or 1954, § 162.
293. IwTr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 271 disallows a deduction for contri-
butions 'as a bad debt under §§: 165 (g) and 166. -Section 162 (e) allows
.certain lobbying- costs as a deductible ordinary and necessary business
expense, but -it specifically excludes contributions to political parties
from this provision, IiNr.- REv.:CoDE OF 1954, § 162(e) (2). A distinction
could be drawn between a candidate's contribution and another person's,
.ind the exclusion of section 162(e) (2) could be said to apply only to
that part of- the provision referring to lobbying expenses. But this
argument would seem to be very weak, particularly in view of INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954 § 276. See note 290 supra and accompanying text.
--.--294. McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 69 (1944).
- - The end results of this ill-considered opinion have been to place an
vven heavier, burden on candidates without wealthy friends, and to
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Although courts have denied direct tax benefits to successful
candidates, 295 in line with McDonald's stricture,2 96 this decision
still favors the incumbent who has certain advantages. The
salaries of his staff are paid by the government, he receives free
publicity inherent in his office, and he can deduct the cost of a
report to his constituents during a campaign, even if it contains
a "brief personal message.1
29 7
The federal governnent should try to emulate the state of
Minnesota, which allows a candidate to deduct from his gross
income all unreimbursed 'campaign expenditures up to statutory
limits.298  Such a provision would give recognition to the con-
cept that a politician does fulfill a worthy function and would
tend to encourage poor, but worthy candidates to run for office.
2. Reasons for a Tax Incentive
A properly drafted tax incentive299 might be a sufficient
force courts to carve out exceptions from this exception to the general
rule of taxing only net income. Compare Shoyer v. United States, 290
F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1961) (deduction disallowed); Rev. Rul. 60-366, 1960-2
CUM. BuLL. 63, with Maness v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 918 (D. Fla.
1965), rev'd, 35 U.S.L. WEEx 2218 (1966); Davenport v. Campbell, 238
F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
295. Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953) (amortization of
expenses over term of office disallowed). It is interesting to note that
this court feared that allowing a tax deduction would subsidize rich
candidates, whereas, the minority in McDonald feared that only- rich
candidates would run without this tax incentive.
296. "To draw a distinction between outlays for reelection and those
for election-to allow the former and disallow the latter-is unsup-
portable in reason." McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 63 (1944).
297. I.T. 4095, 1952-2 CuM. BuLL. 90. The Treasury reasoned that
"The mere fact . . . that it might be politicallr expedient for a Con-
gressman to incur an otherwise deductible expense would not ordinarily
convert that expense into a nondeductible campaign expense." Id;
298. Mum. STAT. ANN. § 290.09(2) (c) (Supp. 1965). Surprisingly
enough, the number of candidates-who claimed the tax 'deduction fell
far below the number who ran for office. -HARD, THE CosTs or DEMOC-
lAcY 395 (Anchor ed. 1962).
. 299. See generally ALEXANDEi, TAX INcENTIVEs FOR PoLrITicAL CON-
TieUTjo'Ns (1961); 1956 Hearings 1250. For' the'latest thinking, on this
problem see Hearings Before the Senate Cominittee o~i Finance on S.
3496,'Amendment No. 732, S. 2006, S. 2965 & S. 3014, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960).
Unfortunately, all tax incentive billshave proposed that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury have responsibility for'developing controls." Shift-
ing decision making to an administrative agency in order to pass- a bill
is often advisable, but such is not the case here. Decisions which would
determine the ultimate success or failure of a tax incentive plan are
too important to be left to an administrative agency. Cf. S. 2965, S.
3014, S. 3435 § 401, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 16203, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966); S. 2006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1. (1965).
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psychological incentive to the parties and the electorate to make
mass solicitations and contributions a practical and significant
way of raising funds, while increasing the percentage of the pop-
ulation involved in politics.300 It has worked for charities and
could work for political parties.30 ' Although both parties are in
favor of a tax incentive for political contributions, 0 2 no tax in-
centive will achieve a significant impact upon the political system
without an educational campaign,3 0 3 which should not be too dif-
ficult to mount,30 4 and reorganization of local party organizations
in order to reach masses of people, which would be very difficult
to accomplish. 305
A tax incentive would also seem to be an appropriate way to
subsidize the political process,3 6 thereby opening it up to less
wealthy candidates. In addition, it "would be an official recog-
nition that political contributions are of value to our society." 307
Furthermore, by leaving subsidization to the people a tax incen-
tive would eliminate most of the problems inherent in the old
proposals for direct government subsidies to the parties or can-
didates.308 Indeed, a tax incentive plan could be designed to
strengthen the national parties,30 9 although this focus might pre-
vent its use when most needed-during primaries-and might ne-
gate some of the flexibility in use, which otherwise could be
attained.81 0
3. Tax Deduction
In the past most tax incentive proposals have not been based
upon a tax deduction, although this form is most analogous to
300. See Peters, supra note 253, at 421.
301. See § I. E. 3 supra.
302. 1961 Hearings 191 (Bailey in favor of a tax credit), 209 (Miller,
Chairman Republican National Committee, in favor of a tax deduction).
See also S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1966); H.R. 16203, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1966), which embody tax deductions.
. 303. The educational campaign should be a "conscious and studied
effort to educate the public to its social responsibilities, an effort [which
would be] facilitated and fortified by adoption of the techniques of
business organization and of mass advertising." Peters, Political Cam-
paign Financing: Tax Incentive for Small Contributors, 18 LA. L. REV.
414, 421 (1958). In effect, political parties should emulate techniques
of charitable organizations.
. 304. The American Heritage Foundation and The Advertising Coun-
cil have already begun, somewhat successfully, such a program.
305. See § I. E. 3 supra.
306. See 1961 Hearings 49-50 (Senator Hickey).
307. Id. at 163 (Senator Long).
308. E.g., party devitalization, etc. See § IV. B. infra.
309. See ALEXANER, op. cit. supra note 299, at 31-32.
310. See Peters, supra note 303, at 434.
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present tax incentives,3 1 ' and has been adopted by those states
which have tax incentives for political contributions.312 The
primary reason advanced why a tax deduction would not be an
appropriate solution is that it would not provide sufficient psy-
chological incentive. A $100 deduction is not likely to motivate
a large contributor 313 or a small contributor, who probably uses
the standard deduction.3 1 4
However, incentive through tax deduction seems to have
gained in popularity this year. President Johnson's proposal3 15
embodies a tax deduction, and most of the tax incentive bills filed
in the Senate this year include a tax deduction separate from
and in addition to the standard deduction either as the primary
incentive or as an alternative.310 Part of the reason for this pop-
311. E.g., the charitable deduction of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
312. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 17234 (Supp. 1965) ($100 deduction for
contribution in any primary or general election); HAWAI REV. LAWS
ch. 121, §5(g) (Supp. 1965) (contributions up to $100 deductible if made
to party committee); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 290.21(3) (e) (Supp. 1965)
($100 deduction plus certain increased sums for specified political offi-
cials); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.160(e) (Supp. 1965) (contributions up to
$50 to a party deductible) (receipt from party committee must accom-
pany tax return).
313. A mere $100 deduction is not likely to motivate a $5,000 giver,
but since his tax rate is likely to be higher than that of a smaller giver,
a greater percentage of it would have gone for taxes if the deduction
had not been available.
314. In 1963 55.7% of individual taxpayers used the standard deduc-
tion, but they accounted for only 22.2% of the total amount of deduc-
tions. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income 1963, 4. Thus, it
is clear that most lower income taxpayers used the standard deduction.
This is the primary reason most of the new tax deduction proposals
would grant a tax deduction for campaign contributions in addition to
the standard deduction. E.g., S. 3435, § 401 (a) (President Johnson's
Bill), H.R. 16203, § 401(a) (House Republican's Bill), 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966).
315. S. 3435, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401(a) (1966), provided for a tax
deduction of up to $100.
316. Senator Smathers introduced S. 2006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), which provided for an alternative tax credit of up to twenty
dollars for a joint return or a tax deduction of up to $500 for contribu-
tions to national party committees or designated state party committees.
Senator Williams introduced two bills. The first, S. 2965, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966), provided a tax credit of 70% of the amount contributed,
deduction not to exceed twenty-five dollars plus a 100% tax deduction
of the amount exceeding $25 up to $100. Under this bill, national party
committees, designated state party committees, and all candidates for
election or nomination at local, state and federal levels would be eligi-
ble. The second, an amendment to H.R. 13103, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), provided for a $100 deduction if the recipient had complied with
all provisions of federal, state, and local law at the time the deduction
is claimed. These proposed deductions would be in addition to the
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ularity seems to be that politicians have realized that the largest
untapped source of funds are persons earning between $10,000
and $15,000 a year, who would be the easiest to solicit,31 7 and who
would most likely be motivated by a $100 deduction.
Even if a tax deduction is not allowed for partisan political
contributions, consideration should be given to changing section
162 of the nternal Revenue Code of 1954 specifically to allow a
tax deduction for bipartisan activities.31 Such an amendment
would serve to eliminate possible inconsistencies under present
regulations.3 19
4. Tax Credit
In the past, most "reform" proposals have incorporated some
form of a tax credit for political contributions. 320 A credit of one
half the total contributions to specified committees or candidates,
up to a maximum of ten dollars a year, is the most common sug-
gestion.321 The purpose of such a tax credit "is to increase the
base of financial contributions. . . . [and get] a large number of
standard deduction. See H.R. 16203, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401(a) (1966)
(House Republican proposal).
317. These people are usually college educated, have a high concept
,of civic duty, and belong to organizations whose mailing lists can be
obtained. See CAmPBELL, THE Aav F~ Ecw VOTER (1960).
318. See PxsIDENT's COMMISSION 12-13. The biggest problem with
this suggestion is distinguishing between bipartisan and partisan
activities.
319. Although Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c) (4) (1965) disallows any de-
duction for lobbying expenses incurred in persuading the public about
legislative matters, the same regulations allow deduction of the cost of
"institutional advertising." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a) (2) (1965). As a
practical matter, in most instances it is impossible to distinguish between
the two. For example, one manufacturer requested a ruling on the de-
ductibility of expenses incurred in connection with federal, state, and
-local elections for purposes of 1) advertising designed to encourage the
public to register and vote and to contribute to the political party or
candidate of their choice; 2) sponsoring a political debate among can-
didates for a particular political office; 3) granting employees time off
with pay for registration and voting; 4) maintaining a payroll deduction
plan for employees wishing to make political contributions. The Treas-
ury found the expenses to be ordinary and necessary expenses of doing
business and therefore deductible, since these activities were "politically
impartial in character" and "reasonably related to the taxpayer's ex-
pected future public patronage." Rev. Rul. 156, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 47,
50.
320. S. 2965, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. 2006, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965); H.R. 7308, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 604, 1555, 2426,
H.R. 9255, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
321. S. 2006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See also the recommen-
dations in PREsIDENT's COmMISSION 17.
[Vol. 51:1
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
people more interested in the campaign. 22  Only one half the
contribution would be allowed as a credit on the theory that part
of the burden of contributing should fall upon the contributor.
However, certain structural defects seriously impair the util-
ity of a tax credit plan. Besides the estimated loss of $30,000,000
a year in tax revenue,323 problems of controlling possible abuses
would seriously limit use of a tax credit as a catalyst for mass
solicitation. Ideally, the tax credit should be available for con-
tributions solicited in a door to door canvass, but a simple re-
ceipt plan is too vulnerable to abuse. A recipient of a $200 con-
tribution could use the available credits to buy nine votes, by
handing out evidence of a twenty dollar contribution ,to nine
people who could then claim a ten dollar credit against their
taxes. In effect, these receipts would be as good as cash, yet
would cost their distributor nothing. Whether abuse would be
widespread is doubtful, but even a small amount of manipula-
tion would affect significant sums of money, and would ser.-
iously undermine the public's willingness to give.' Maximum
control would require a contributor to purchase'a special three
part stamp at the post office: one part retained by the post'of-
fice, the second going to the party or candidate, and the thir4
filed with the contributor's tax return for the tax credit.324 ' But
such a plan would provide no incentive for mass contributions
because only strongly motivated individuals would be likely ito
make the necessary effort to contribute. Perhaps the proble'm
might be alleviated by selling these same three part stamps to
individuals and to party solicitors who have properly executed
authorizations from the parties.32  Although this would neces-
sitate extra work for party or candidate, such a plan would be
less susceptible to abuse and would preserve secrecy of the done e
from the Internal Revenue Service.3 26
322. 1962 Hearings 37, 43; 1961 Hearings 163.
323. Letter from Ass't Sec. of Treas. Surrey to Sen. Long (Mo.),
Feb. 28, 1961, quoted in 1961 Hearings 114.
324. See ALExAiER, op. cit. supra note 299, at 44-45, for further
,elaboration.
325. Cf. PREsinENT's CommnssioN 15.
326. It may seem anomalous to require the parties to publicize the
contributions they receive, and at the same time to insist upon a con-
tributor's right to secrecy; but there is a vast difference between, the
two. Although the Internal Revenue Service could theoretically check
.party records to see to whom a taxpayer made his contribution, it is
unlikely to be done. The Internal Revenue Service should not be influ-
enced by a taxpayer's party affiliation, as might happen if the infor-




Determining who should be eligible to receive contributions
covered by a tax incentive raises a series of dilemmas:
To help candidates for election is to risk hurting candidates
for nomination;
To help federal candidates alone is to risk hurting nonfederal
candidates;
To help candidates is to hurt the parties;
To help parties without assurance that they will help the
candidates is to risk leaving candidates to rely upon large
contributors;
To help parties with assurance of candidate allocation raises
allocation problems;
To stress candidate and party committees hurts permanent
nonparty committees.
Although a suggestion has been made to divide such eligi-
bility into three parts-local, congressional, and nationa1S27-it
should probably be limited to national parties and federal candi-
dates.3 2 8 There are simply too many local offices, and, besides
federal candidates are usually in the most need of money. Candi-
dates for nomination or election to federal offices who have
qualified to be placed on the ballot should be eligible, since
they are most in danger of becoming obligated to moneyed inter-
ests, and because such candidates are most likely to encourage
contributions from independent voters. Only those committees
whose support such candidates have publicly authorized should
be eligible because "placing the responsibility for accreditation
directly and openly upon the candidate should make it difficult
for undesirable fringe groups of either the left or the right to
qualify. ' 32 9 And such restricted eligibility obviates problems of
bureaucratic determination of who supported whom. The na-
tional parties330 should be able to designate one national com-
mittee and one committee in each state which would qualify to
327. 1961 Hearings (Bailey).
328. As a practical matter, the tax benefit could not be confined tQ
federal candidates because national party committees could transfer part
of their funds to ineligible candidates. But this is not an undesirable
consequence; by transferring funds, national party committees could
build party solidarity and responsibility.
329. Peters, supra note 303, at 433.
330. A definition of "national party" as one whose candidate for
President is on at least ten state ballots has been suggested. PRsmiEN'S
COMmiSSiON 16. This definition has been adopted by most bills intro-
duced in the 89th Congress. E.g., S. 3014, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966);
S. 2965, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. 2006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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receive such contributions. 31 This would tend to prevent splin-
tering of the national parties, encourage greater party responsi-
bility, and create a constituency for the national parties which
is now lacking.
Any tax incentive should be operated on an annual basis.
3 3 2
An attempt might be made to shorten campaigns by reducing the
time of eligibility to give and to receive contributions which
qualify for a tax incentive. Such a plan, however, would not be
worth the administrative difficulties which would be placed
upon the parties and candidates, since mass solicitation would
be effective only near the time of election when voter interest is
present. Instead, candidates should be eligible beyond the end
of election years, for a period sufficient to pay debts incurred
in the immediately preceding campaigns, while the national par-
ties should always be eligible.
B. GovMENT SUBSIDY
Direct federal subsidization was proposed as long ago as 1907
by President Roosevelt 333 and as recently as 1961 by President
Kennedy. 3 4 Indeed, just recently John Kenneth Galbraith has
suggested adoption of direct government subsidies, even at the
state level, where problems of control are much greater.335 The
alleged purpose of such a subsidy is to combat the effects of
high costs upon campaigns by lessening influence of large contrib-
utors, making the parties more willing to nominate those fi-
nancially unable to run, and helping to inform voters by pub-
licizing issues and candidates.
Serious problems, however, stand in the way of adopting a
subsidy. In the past, most subsidy proprosals would have granted
fixed sums to the parties on condition that they reformed cer-
tain campaign practices. 33 6 The most important objection to such
331. See PREsIDENT's CoMMssIoN 15.
332. ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 299, at 34.
333. 42 CONG. REC. 78 (1907).
334. See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1961, p. 14, col. 4.
335. For the provisions of this highly detailed and imaginative pro-
posal, see Boston Globe, August 18, 1966, pp. 1, 8. While there is little
chance of passing such a proposal, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court
might well hold it unconstitutional, note 338 infra, it indicates the trend
of academic and political thinking.
336. E.g., S. 227, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), which would have
given $1,000,000 for radio and television expenses to a political party
whose candidate for President received ten per cent of the popular vote.
Minor parties whose Presidential candidates received more than one
per cent of the popular vote would have received $100,000. The bill
contained a proviso that the parties streamline their conventions and
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a fixed subsidy was fear of government interference with the
present political system. Under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments an individual has an equal right to express his views and
to influence others. The state may not upset that equality, which
it might do by granting a fixed subsidy to the parties, thereby
distorting their power.
The first amendment's guarantee of free political action seems
to make the distribution of power within a party a matter in-
appropriate for state regulation, absent a very compelling gov-
ernmental interest. The dominant party should not easily be
allowed to interfere through official channels with the organiza-
tion of its opponents. Existing measures regulating party
activities are justified either as curbs on corruption or as special
situations in which the regulated activity has in fact a quasi-
public function. The mere existence of a legitimate public pur-
pose does not justify the extensive interference threatened by
[direct government subsidies].8 37
Massachusetts, for example, seems to have adopted this reasoning,
although the court clothed it in the "public purpose" doctrine8 38
Nor is this the sole problem. Other major objections to a fixed
governmental subsidy have been neatly summarized:
It is certain to raise problems of Federal control over the parties
and over the mass media of communications. Federal subsidiza-
tion would also tend to entrench existing parties and party lead-
ers in positions of prominence. One of the best indications of
the support for a given political organization is its ability to
raise funds. If people are not interested enough to contribute,
why should the Federal Government pick up the tab?3 89
A new form of subsidy which obviates many objections to
government subsidies has been proposed by Senator Long of
Louisiana.840 This bill3 41 as originally drafted would have pro-
shorten campaigning time. However, even its sponsor admitted that the
bill would not discourage or significantly lessen the importance of the
large contributor. 1961 Hearings 46.
337. Note, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1260, 1202 (1965).
338. Massachusetts has held that the government cannot subsidize
political parties because such activity does not fall within the "public
purpose doctrine." Opinion of the Justices, 347 Mass. 797, 197 N.E.2d
691 (1964). Supposedly only public officials can spend public funds,
although the same justices permitted state support for a failing public
transportation company. Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 800, 152
N.E.2d 90 (1958).
339. 1961 Hearings 33.
340. See statements of Senator Long (La.) and the author in Hear-
ings Before the Senate Committee on Finance on S. 3496, Amend. No.
732, S. 2006, S. 2965 & S. 3014, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 74 (1966). As re-
ported out of Committee and approved by the Senate and House, the
bill may combine many of the benefits of tax incentives as well as the
simplicity of a subsidy. Each taxpayer when filing his tax form will
indicate whether he wants one dollar of his tax payment to go into a
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vided the national parties with a subsidy of one dollar for each
vote received by its presidential candidate over 15,000,000 votes.
The use of these funds, however, would be restricted to re-
imbursing presidential campaign expenditures. Of all bills thus
far proposed, this one seems closest to achieving the desired
goals of encouraging competent candidates to run and elimi-
nating "corrupt" influences. It would greatly improve cam-
paign planning because a presidential candidate would know
that he cauld count on receiving at least a predictable mini-
mum of campaign funds and thus would not continually have
to change his plans as the flow of funds varied. It might
even improve the quality of national party leaders by at-
tracting more altruistic individuals, since party fund raising
duties would not be as onerous, and patronage, as a motive for
seeking party positions, would decline in importance. Controlling
transfers of funds would also be much easier under this plan
than under tax incentive plans, since the Comptroller would pay
the party directly after the party certified the bill. Nor does
this plan fall into the pitfalls faced by prior plans for direct
subsidies. Since it does not condition the grant on acceptance of
"reforms," it would allow the parties to react naturally, that is,
it would permit them to reform themselves without artificial
conditions which merely encourage evasion. 342 Similarly, since
fund to be used to support the candidates as provided in the bill. See
H.R. 13103, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 301-305 (1966); S. REP. No. 1707, H.R.
REP. No. 2327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
341. S. 3496, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The Senate and the House
of Representatives passed this bill as this article went to press in a
modified form as an amendment to H.R. 13103, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§
301-305 (1966). Several changes were made by the Conference Com-
mittee: If a political party receives over 15,000,000 votes in the pre-
ceding presidential election, it may receive one dollar multiplied by the
total number of popular votes cast in such preceding presidential election
for candidates of political parties whose candidates received 15,000,000
or more votes. If the political party receives over 5,000,000 votes but
less than 15,000,000, it is entitled to one dollar per vote over 5,000,000.
No payment, however, is to be made to parties whose candidate for
President received less than 5,000,000 votes in the preceding election.
Payments are not to be made until the total expenditures incurred to
the date of payment have been certified by the party to the comptroller,
and the party has complied with requests for information by the comp-
troller. See H.R. REP. No. 2327 & S. REP. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966); note 340 supra.
342. For example, forcing the parties to shorten their campaigns,
cf. S. 227, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), would only aid an incumbent
President, who can make "non-political speeches" to fulfill his duty to
inform the people. This is a significant problem, since it is almost
impossible to make a distinction between political and non-political
presidential utterances, particularly since a valid goal of a presidential
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the subsidy would vary with the popular vote, the problem of the
first amendment should be avoided because there would be no
chance of governmental interference with political process.
However, there are certain weaknesses in the proposal which
should be strengthened before the bill's enactment. It would
probably be better to allow the parties to decide how their sub-
sidies are to be used, rather than to limit their use solely to
presidential campaign expenditures. This would be an addi-
tional defense against any attack based on the first amendment
and would increase protection against "corrupt" influences. Al-
though the Long bill would allow a Presidential candidate to re-
fuse large, favor-seeking contributions, such a refusal would re-
sult in these sums of money gravitating toward congressional
races. Further, control could be tightened by having the Comp-
troller pay the parties' bills directly, after party certification,
rather than pay the money to the parties which have to redistrib-
ute the money among their creditors. Finally, since this pro-
posal would not aid candidates for nomination, it should be com-
bined with a proposal allowing candidates to deduct personal un-
reimbursed campaign expenses up to a fixed limit.
Although the normal first reaction to government subsidy of
political parties is one of repulsion, reflection indicates that this
may be the only way to begin real reforms. Government subsidy
of political parties has worked well in Puerto Rico,343 and it might
just be the device required to ease transition of the parties to-
ward a more representative instrument of democracy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It seems clear that although economic interests should have
some influence upon our political system, they exercise too much
influence today. Limitations upon the sources of contributions
and the amounts that can be contributed are wise; limitations on
the amount of money that a party or candidate can receive are
not. The danger of money in politics is not too much money;
rather, it is a disproportionate amount from large contributors.
However, reforms which impose sanctions should play only a
subsidiary role to reforms which structure politics to encourage
politicians to respond to community, rather than special interests.
Effective publicity is the sine qua non of any effective re-
statement is gaining public support for his programs. See Goldwater
v. FCC, 379 U.S. 893 (1964).




form. All contributions of fifty dollars or more received by a
party or candidate for nomination or election should be disclosed
in frequent, uniform, easily accessible reports. All committees
expecting to spend more than $1,000 a year should be required
to register and file reports. Establishment of a central repos-
itory and enforcement agency would help immeasurably. Pub-
licity has an intrinsic cleansing effect and leaves the definition
of "undue" or "corrupt" influence where it belongs-in the hands
of the electorate.
If the influence of large contributors is to be curbed, ade-
quate financing for the parties and candidates must be available
from other sources. The passage of Senator Long's bill should
alleviate the problem for the national parties and perhaps for
some candidates, although the problem of adequate financing
will still remain for most. Funds for these candidates should
come from mass contributions or the national parties. Mass con-
tributions might be encouraged by a publicity campaign to make
political giving a respectable social function and by providing a
tangible psychological incentive, such as a tax deduction, al-
though the probability that Congress will pass another financial
incentive is slim indeed. Alternatively, if the national parties
were able to use the funds received under Senator Long's bill as
they saw fit, many needy candidates might be helped. Available
national party funds might also be increased by limiting the
amount a person can contribute to candidates without imposing a
ceiling on the amount a person can contribute to the national par-
ties. Because of the Long subsidy, the national parties should
no longer be at the mercy of large contributors, and the parties
should be able to support needy candidates and encourage party
unity with a minimum danger of undue influence. In any case,
one essential reform should be carried out immediately. Candi-
dates should be able to deduct personal, unreimbursed expendi-
tures incurred in running for office. There seems to be no reason
why this should not or could not be done, and it seems to be the
only way to encourage competent candidates to run for nomina-
tion.
Although both the Administration and House Republicans
agree on the basic reforms which need to be taken, 44 passing
344. S. 3435 (President Johnson's Bill) and H.R. 16203 (House Re-
publican Bill), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) are essentially identical.
Most differences between the bills are more apparent than real. For
example, although H.R. 16203, § 102 spells out the prohibition against
union contributions and defines unions, it would do no more than S.
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effective reforms will not be an easy task.3 45 However, if the
public presses hard enough, and politicians cooperate by press-
ing the Dodd affair, some reform efforts could lead to Congres-
sional action.
3435, which leaves the present prohibition against union contributions
intact.
345. As this article went to press the" House Subcommittee on Elec-
tions of the Committee on Administration favorably reported out H.R.
18162, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), which was supported by House Re-
publicans. 112 CoxG. REC. 24590 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1966) Essentially it
provides for the following: 1) reports covering conventions, primaries,
and elections in one or more states would be required from candidates
and from committees spending at least $1,000 in one state; 2) debts and
loans would have to be reported at regular intervals; 3) reports would
be filed with the federal district courts and with an independent agency
called the Federal Elections Comnnssion which would have broad pow-
ers to audit reports, investigate, issue -subpoenas and injunctions, act
promptly on complaints, and encourage state election authorities to de-
velop uniform procedures; 4) limitations -on candidate and committee
expenditures would be abolished; 5) although corporations could prob-
ably buy advertising in convention programs the cost would not be de-
ductible; 6) corporations, labor unions, and trade associations with cor-
porate funds or compulsory dues or- assessments would be prohibited
from financially supporting by direct or indirect contributions or ex-
penditures any organization which- participates in political activities,
although affiliated organizations could operate so long as its funds were
voluntarily contributed; 7) gifts of $100 or more would be reported;
8) souvenirs costing less than twenty-five dollars could be sold, but
advertising in political program books could not be sold; 9) contributions
in another's name would be prohibited.
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